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ABSTRACT 
IRRIGATION COSTS AND PRICES: 
AN INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRICING STRATEGIES IN 






This paper explores the link between cost and price in two irrigation schemes in 
Mali - the Office du Niger (ON), a large-scale gravity irrigation authority, and a number 
of small pump-irrigated fields at village perimeters along the Niger River (Petits 
Perimetres d’Irrigation Villagois).  I argue that the effectiveness of cost-recovery pricing 
strategies for improving the long-run financial sustainability of irrigation systems and 
advancing national development objectives is a function of decision-making processes, 
which influence the distribution and absolute levels of cost and benefit flows.   
Participants’ willingness and capacity to invest in problem solving play an important part 
in irrigation system viability by increasing the rate of technological and institutional 
change, which can increase benefits and decrease costs of production.  Understanding 
formal and informal relationships between service users and service providers can help 
reveal institution-based sources of incentives and disincentives for parties to invest in 
producing effort and solving problems.  The paper examines the price strategies in two 
case studies and the relationships among stakeholders in the design and implementation 
of each system’s price strategies.  Institutional theory suggests ways to align individual 
incentives with the objectives of the pricing strategy; targeted investments may be needed 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
This paper provides an institutional economic description and analysis of two 
irrigation-pricing cases in Mali.  The first case is the Office du Niger (ON), a large-scale 
gravity irrigation authority.  The second is the case of a number of small pump-irrigated 
fields at village perimeters, primarily in the Mopti region, that receive governmental or 
non-governmental subsidization; these irrigation schemes are collectively referred to as 
Petits Perimetres d’Irrigation Villagois (PPIVs).  Both schemes are principally used for 
flooded rice production.   
In both cases, formal irrigation pricing institutions (pricing policies) are primarily 
designed as tactics to recover the financial costs of the irrigation scheme.
1  Irrigation-
pricing institutions are analyzed with respect to their ability to promote objectives 
outlined by the National Sub-Sector Strategy for Irrigation Development (SNDI) - to 
increase sustainable agricultural productivity in support of national strategies for 
development.  Relevant national development strategies include the National Poverty 
Reduction Strategy, the National Environmental Action Plan, the National Economic 
Growth Strategy, and the National Food Security Strategy.  These strategies are designed 
to promote a vision for Mali of reduced poverty and increased sustainable development.  
In the paper I explore the link between cost and price in the two irrigation cases 
reviewed.  I argue that the effectiveness of cost-recovery pricing strategies for improving 
                                                 
1 Irrigation pricing can be broadly defined as the formal and informal rules for exchanging responsibilities 
for rights to irrigation services.  In both cases reviewed, designed pricing strategies or policies serve as a 
primary formal institutional link between the provision or allocation of common-property resources (CPR) 
rights to the user (the good being sold - access to the irrigation service, the water and the irrigated parcel of 
land) and the appropriation of CPR responsibilities from users (the price of the good - work, cash payment, 
crop share, etc.).  In Mali, all land and water are owned by the State.  Irrigation infrastructure is owned by 
the State in the Office du Niger (ON) and is owned collectively by users’ associations in the Small Scale 
Irrigated Village Perimeters (Petits Perimetres d’Irrigation Villagois - PPIVs).  The allocation of usufruct 
rights is shaped by ownership of equipment, family size (labor), and power (relationships to land 
management committees).     
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the long-run financial sustainability of irrigation systems and advancing development 
objectives is a function of the design of decision-making and accountability institutions 
which influence the distribution and absolute levels of cost and benefit flows based on 
resulting institution-based incentives.   
This argument rests on two simple but important observations.  The first is that the 
rate of technological change is influenced by both endogenous and exogenous factors.  
Second, the distribution of transaction costs between irrigation service users and 
irrigation service providers, including information, contracting, monitoring and 
enforcement costs, is persistently asymmetrical.  Making these observations, I further 
argue that a system’s long-run financial viability and level of productivity are a function 
of participants’ willingness to invest in problem solving and interest in directing that 
effort toward generating technological and institutional ingenuity that reduces the costs of 
irrigation service provision.  Understanding formal and informal relationships between 
service users and service providers can help reveal sources of incentives and 
disincentives for parties to invest in producing effort and creative problem solving or 
ingenuity and can help trace the target of its application.  Institutions can be designed to 
align individual incentives with the objectives of the pricing strategy so that ingenuity is 
generated and is applied to advancing personal and national objectives rather than to 
personal gain at the expense of the common goals; investments may be necessary to 
provide participants with the means to act on incentives (e.g. training, information, 
oversight).  
  10
This research is dually motivated by 1) the literature gap in irrigation pricing 
research in Africa, particularly in West Africa and by 2) the limited success of irrigation 
projects in Mali despite significant (though declining) donor and government investment.   
The bulk of irrigation pricing literature is based on research conducted in Asia, the 
Middle East, and Europe – all regions with significantly different irrigation histories and 
contexts than Sub-Saharan Africa.  Research on irrigation in West Africa is largely 
limited to organization and government reports, which are often restricted to financial 
analyses and have limited circulation.  Furthermore, irrigation research and reform efforts 
in Mali tend to focus on either technological cost-reducing remedies or project-financing 
institutions – both with the objective of increasing the productivity, sustainability and 
hectare coverage of irrigation systems.  That physical transformation costs are affected by 
governance structures, social relationships, learning, and history is rarely acknowledged.   
Designs, in the sense of their being practical ideas applied to solve problems, are 
both inputs to and outputs of the economic process.  They demonstrate cumulative 
causation and path dependency, and they can change the distribution and level of 
production costs.  The relationship between price strategies and participants’ (farmers and 
irrigation system managers) means and incentives for developing and applying ideas 
creatively is largely overlooked in irrigation literature. 
Donor and governmental funding for large physical infrastructure projects is 
declining in Africa and the financing approaches for remaining projects are 
fundamentally changing (Anyemedu, 2003).  Growth rates of area under irrigation in 
West Africa declined dramatically over the past 25 years, and investments are 
increasingly made as loans and/or short-term start-up subsidies conditioned on  
  11
implementation of cost-recovery pricing strategies and irrigation management transfer 
(Rosegrant and Perez, 1997).  While average yields per hectare have increased, 
unfortunately, irrigation projects continue to scale back or close, require significant 
operational subsidies, redistribute income away from the poorest, and/or have high rates 
of farmer turn-over from eviction due to non-payment of irrigation fees.
2  
Based on food trade and production projections made by the Institute for Water 
Management Institute, if Mali were to increase the total land area served by productive 
irrigation systems by 33% before 2020 (the most optimistic scenario modeled), it would 
still be unable to meet food security goals.  Specific policy attention would be needed to 
direct the benefits of the expanded production toward meeting food security and poverty 
alleviation goals (Rosegrant and Perez, 1997).    
The two cases reviewed share four significant characteristics that warrant their 
joint review in this paper.  First, international donors are seeking to expand irrigation 
projects in both areas of Mali with the objective of advancing rural development; 
financial cost recovery is a key tactical objective this strategy.  Second, both projects are 
implemented on government-owned land; farmers have usufruct rights conditioned on 
irrigation-fee payment.  Third, both projects rely on representational organizations to 
design projects’ pricing strategies.  Fourth, both systems are plagued by high eviction 
rates of farmers who are unable to pay required irrigation fees, often affecting the 
poorest/highest risk farmers in the community. 
                                                 
2  Despite these problems, significant private and international investments are still being made in the 
Office du Niger; the Schaeffer sugar cane project at Markala and targeted Millennium Challenge Account 
funds are among them. 
  
  12
The case studies are based on a series of structured and unstructured interviews 
with farmers, researchers, donors, and organizational leaders (government and user 
organizations) and review of various research and government reports.  The interviews 
were conducted as part of an effort to inform the development of survey questions to be 
used for a review of West African irrigation-pricing strategies.  
Interviews helped to identify critical pricing issues that needed to be addressed by 
the survey.  Initial interview questions were largely influenced by Ostrom (1992), 
Chambers (1980), and Johansson (2000) among others.  From interview to interview, the 
guide changed to reflect issues raised by prior interviewees.  A final list of suggested 
survey questions is in Appendix I.  It is intended to be an interview guide only and not a 
questionnaire to be followed verbatim. 
Interviews were limited by language and opportunities to conduct fieldwork.  As a 
result, there is bias due to the fact that (with very few exceptions) I interviewed people 
who spoke French and who were selected as representatives by a donor, research, or 
government agency.  In the paper I identify illiteracy, innumeracy, and lack of French 
language skills as contributing factors to farmers’ relative disadvantage in bargaining, 
contracting and enforcement.  I was unable to discuss directly with non-francophone 
farmers some of the strategies may have developed to overcome these obstacles. 
The interview guide was designed to engage three types of stakeholders for each 
project being studied – farmers, irrigation system administrators, and farmers 
organizations.  I was able to interview at least two subjects in each category for each case 
study.    
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In the ON, I conducted formal interviews and was also able to attend otherwise-
organized meetings intended to collect opinions and feedback from various stakeholders 
about the Office pricing strategy. 
PPIV systems are not organized as clearly as the ON along the lines of 
administrators, users, and organizations.  Formal interviews were conducted with three 
government officials from the Office du Riz Mopti (ORM) and one ORM PPIV farmer 
who was also the president of his village PPIV advisory committee.  I was also able to 
conduct three panel interviews – one with agricultural extensionists and farmers who 
were also elected farmer representatives (Valorisation des Resources en Eau de Surface - 
VRES); one with donor agency professionals (Action pour la Formation et 
l’Autopromotion Rurale – AFAR, VRES); and one with diesel motor pump mechanics 
and extensionists (Association des Volontaires pour le Developpment du Delta - AVD).  
Additional individual interviews were conducted with irrigation sector professionals 
including two interviews and a field visit/farmer interview with the director and founder 
of AVD, a mechanic from a private garage that services the region’s motorpumps, and a 
Malian economist working on irrigation research. 
In both cases, farmers were the most difficult to schedule for interviews; 
government officials were easiest to access – another source of informational bias.  In 
most cases, I was able to informally pose many of the interview guide questions to 
farmers, researchers, and irrigation professionals in other organizational meetings or 
during casual conversations.  Verifying and background information was attained from 
government, donor, and organization reports and professionals.   
  14
Section 2 summarizes relevant economic concepts and theory.  It begins with a 
basic description of irrigation-pricing strategy components, objectives, and contextual 
considerations (2.1).  It then provides a review of the institutional economic theory used 
to analyze the two cases (2.2).  In section three, a general description of irrigated 
agriculture in Mali, including national strategic objectives is reviewed.  This is followed 
by the description and analysis of each of the case studies, first the Office du Niger and 
then the PPIVs.  Finally, the argument is reevaluated in light of the two cases and 
questions for further research are raised.  
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2  IRRIGATION PRICING AND THEORETICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1  Irrigation Pricing 
Water pricing is a general term that is often used to describe the pricing of water 
delivery services - household or agricultural.  When applied to irrigation, water pricing 
generally refers to the pricing of two economic goods: 1) water delivery services (timing, 
location, and quality of delivery service); and 2) the water being delivered, usually by 
quantity, but sometimes in terms of water quality also.
3  In this paper, because Mali does 
not charge fees for extraction, diversion or pollution of water resources, the term 
irrigation pricing is used rather than water pricing to avoid misconceptions about what 
goods are being priced.
4  Prices may be paid in cash, labor, percentage or fixed value of 
crop production, and/or any combination of these goods.   
An irrigation-pricing policy can be considered a strategy designed to advance 
certain policy objectives.  The strategy has three interrelated components.  They are the 
price structure, the price level, and the sanction system.  Price structure determines the 
bases on which fees are assessed to users (e.g., per hectare of land irrigated, per cubic 
meter of water used, according to crop type, etc.).  The price level refers to the price set 
                                                 
3 The two goods are complementary in agriculture. The financial value water is higher if delivery service is 
reliable and meets demand, and where water is scarce, reliable irrigation services have higher value.  The 
values of delivery services and water can also be related to the value of the crops being irrigated, other 
related production costs (such as land and fertilizer), and the relative demand for water in other sectors or in 
downstream regions. 
4 The Malian water law changed in 2002 to generally require permission and payment for water extraction, 
diversion, and pollution, but no implementation plan has been designed or implemented.  I did not find 
anyone outside the Ministry of Water Resources who was even aware of the law change.   
I was able to identify only one case in West Africa of pricing water resources.  The Government of Senegal 
charges SAUR, a private company with a contract to supply drinking water services to a number of cities in 
the country, for the quantity of fresh water that is piped into the Dakar area.  Fees paid by consumers cover 
both the cost of water and the cost agriculture in and around Dakar.  Mali is still working on surveying its 
existing water resources and developing international agreements regarding shared river basins, which 
would help establish the quantity of water supply each country has a right to use/sell.  Moving forward at 
the international/regional levels may be a useful precursor to promoting water resource pricing at local 
levels.    
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after the criteria or units of consumption are established.  Often price structures are 
relatively fixed over time while price levels vary with changing costs and/or political 
tides.   
A third component of water pricing strategies is the design of sanctions for 
behaviors that violate the pricing strategy.  Sanctions can be formal and/or informal.  
Fines, fees, loss of rights are examples of formal sanctions of non-payment.  Public 
criticism, boycott, and withholding cooperation, are examples of informal sanctioning by 
farmers who pay fees but do not receive the agreed-upon service (Ostrom, et al. 1994).  
In both cases reviewed, formal pricing-policy sanctions are downwardly applied to ensure 
user compliance with payment policy through threat of eviction for non-payment.  No 
sanctions exist to ensure management compliance with service-provision responsibilities; 
compliance measures are limited to institutions that promote transparency, coupled only 
with electoral pressure in some cases. 
 
Figure 1:  Components of a Price Strategy 
 
Each component of the strategy is an institution that is defined by decision-
making institutions or rules.   Ostrom (1994) identifies three levels of rule formation 
through decision making, as follows:  operational rules affect day-to-day decisions made 
by participants; collective-choice rules affect operational activities in by determining who 
Decision Making 
Processes
Price Structure  Price Levels  Sanctions  
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is eligible to participate in operational rule-making and how operational rules are made; 
constitutional choice rules determine eligibility and procedures for collective choice rule-
making.   
The objectives of pricing policies are also established through a decision-making 
process.  Objectives are likely to include cost recovery, demand management, allocative 
efficiency, and/or income distribution (Johansson, 2001).   
 Cost  recovery refers to users’ payment of the financial costs
5 of water delivery services 
and, where relevant, financial costs associated with water extraction or diversion rights.   
Decisions are made explicitly or implicitly to determine which/whose financial costs will 
count in the cost-recovery accounting.  For example, the cost of building livestock access 
points is increasingly accepted as part of the price of building irrigation canals and is not 
passed onto herdsmen.
6  Pesticide application may damage natural fisheries at the 
expense of fishermen.  Total costs and their distribution may vary based on trade-offs 
between the level of fixed costs and level of O&M costs – important particularly when 
different groups are paying for different costs.  Finally, there can also be a tradeoff 
between management and organizational development costs and costs of physical 
construction and O&M.   
 Demand  management occurs if users are encouraged to invest in water and/or land 
conservation efforts in order to lower the irrigation price they pay.  If irrigation services 
                                                 
5 There are usually additional economic costs associated with irrigation systems that have not been 
internalized into the financial cost structure of the irrigation system.  Farmers may still pay these costs, 
however.  For example, increased health problems may be associated with irrigation techniques.  Farmers 
and their families may pay related costs in terms of increased health care but this cost is not internalized 
into the financial cost of the water. 
6 Livestock degrade canal walls when being watered.  Designing specific access points decreases overall 
damage from livestock and localizes the damage to fewer places, improving system managers’ ability to 
keep track of degradation and rehabilitate as necessary, lowering damages and O&M costs.  Similarly, 
villagers use canal water for washing, bathing, water collection etc.  Steep earthen canal walls quickly 
erode under the heavy traffic and cause degradation of the entire canal system.  Building concrete stairs 
provides a safer and less damaging means of access to canal water.  In both cases, enforcement costs of 
managing access to irrigation water would be more costly than investing in access point construction.  
  18
are priced by cubic meter of water delivered, water-saving practices may be 
implemented.  If services are priced by hectare, increased efforts to intensify production 
per hectare may result (which would likely reduce infrastructure costs and water used per 
unit of output).  Demand-management pricing is complemented by extension services 
that provide farmers with training to evaluate alternative water–saving production 
strategies. 
 Allocative  efficiency usually refers to prices that vary with the dynamic value of the 
good being allocated so that buyers make use decisions in reaction to changing values.  
Inability to rent land and obstacles to crop diversification can limit farmers’ ability to 
respond to irrigation price signals.  
 An  efficient allocation is defined in relation to the objective sought and by how 
property rights (the rules of exchange) are allocated.  Food security, poverty reduction 
and economic development are part of Mali’s objective function.  Allocations that 
generate high financial returns but detract from other objectives may not be efficient with 
respect to advancing identified objectives. 
 Income  distribution  impacts can be analyzed at various levels:  among farmers in an 
irrigated perimeter, among farmers in a watershed, and among multiple/diverse water 
resource users in a region.  A variety of factors influence cost distribution.  Choice of 
costs to be recovered, criteria upon which prices are based (per hectare, per unit of water 
delivered, etc.), and design of sanctioning systems could each affect income distribution.  
In tiered or block pricing, the definition of user classifications or blocks can influence 
income distribution. 
The objectives listed above are not mutually exclusive; strategies may aim to meet 
combinations of objectives depending on a region’s development and political priorities.    
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An irrigation-pricing strategy should be tailored for system-specific 
characteristics of variables including: water supply (water quality, accessibility of water – 
depth and distance to site of use, variability of flow or precipitation by season or year, 
effects of upstream water use practices); distribution systems (systems have different 
infrastructure and human resource management needs and capacities); and user and 
management demographics and organization (diversity of farmer capacities, holding size 
variability, cash/credit and labor availability, technical and managerial capacities, history 
of cooperative management or corruption, etc.).   Best practices for irrigation pricing 
irrigation will vary by situation and over time.  As a result, decision makers’ ability to 
assess and respond to changing situational conditions at all levels is paramount to 
irrigation system sustainability. 
How decisions are made and who is included in those decisions determines how 
the issues listed above are reflected in the pricing strategy.  The decision-making process 
defines whose interests are considered in the objective function.  The process also 
influences the degree of stakeholder buy-in to the rules produced, the degree to which 
stakeholders have been able to contribute information and opinion, and the degree to 
which innovative solutions have been applied to existing problems.  Decisions shape and 
are shaped by formal and informal institutions which frame the relationships 
between/among various decision makers.  This, in turn, affects how stakeholders respond 
to, invest in, and comply with formal rules or institutions.  
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2.2  Institutional Economic Theory:  Prices, Costs, and Decision-Making 
Both irrigation-pricing strategies described in the following section are designed 
to be tactics to achieve irrigation system cost recovery and financial sustainability.  The 
nature of a pricing strategy’s treatment of cost recovery can be addressed by exploring 
three questions:  1) What are the costs of production?  2) Which costs of production are 
internalized into the formal price?  3) How are those costs distributed? 
This section reviews institutional theory that regards costs as a function of 
endogenous factors including ingenuity and organizational learning.  It supports the 
argument that decision-making processes influence the distribution and absolute levels of 
cost and benefit flows in the medium and long-run.  The second part of this section 
considers the relationship between decision-making processes and cost.  It explores how 
formal and informal relationships between service users and service providers define 
incentives and disincentives for parties to invest in producing effort and creative problem 
solving or ingenuity.  It also addresses the problem of ingenuity being applied by 
different parties to achieve conflicting goals and how institutions can be designed to 
realign incentives to serve common goals despite parties’ opposing interests. 
2.2.1 Costs:  Samuels and Schmid (1997) explain that a notion of real 
costs - broadly referring to the costs of production – is misleading.  The authors explain 
that costs of physical factors of production (in irrigated rice production - fertilizer, 
equipment, delivered water, labor, seeds, etc.) are actually a function of technology, and 
that technology, in turn, is a function of “creative imagination, invention, and 
application.”  Institutions affect which physical costs are internalized into the market as 
“real costs” of production; they influence the price levels of physical costs as a result of  
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the ways in which contracting, information, and enforcement alter the price of acquiring a 
set of goods and services, and finally physical costs of transformation can be reduced if 
decision-makers are inspired to think creatively about how to solve problems and reduce 
costs.  Institutions can increase investment in creative problem solving through the design 
of financial or social incentives.  
Paul Romer examines the role of knowledge as an endogenous factor of economic 
growth, the level of which partially determines an economy’s steady state.  “Ideas are the 
designs that allow us to make limited physical resources ever more valuable (Romer, 
1990, Romer, 1994).”
7  He emphasizes the non-rival and non-excludable characteristics 
of knowledge, a key factor of production that fuels technological change, and suggests 
that institutions must be designed to increase incentives for its production and 
application.
8   
Thomas Homer-Dixon (1995) considers the contribution of technology to 
productivity and clarifies that ideas do not have to be new, just practical.  He defines 
ingenuity as the ability of people and organizations to develop and apply ideas, solutions, 
and institutions to problem solving.  Homer-Dixon (1994) notes, “Just as important are 
ideas about social organization, especially about reforming and building institutions.”  
Where technical ingenuity can reduce physical transformation costs and problems, social 
ingenuity can change the costs and benefits associated with specific institutions.  The two 
                                                 
7 It is worth noting that good designs can also make limited financial resources ever more valuable – 
incredibly important for those attempting to irrigate with a decreasing availability of investment funds.  
Purchase prices of physical inputs can be reduced depending on the effort or ingenuity used to acquire them 
(whether each person purchases inputs separately, can organize purchasing cooperatives, can bargain and 
contract effectively, can buy when supply is high vs. low, etc.).   
8 In Rules, Games and Common-Pool Resources, Ostrom also characterizes rules as public goods – high 
exclusion costs goods for which improvement requires high fixed costs and often results in free riding.   
(Ostrom, et al., 1994).   
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factors are inseparably produced and consumed.  For example, production of 
technological ingenuity in communications can facilitate social ingenuity through the 
expanded exchange of ideas and information, which can in turn generate additional 
technological ideas and designs.   
Resource scarcity can increase the severity and complexity of technological and 
social problems; this accordingly increases the demand for ingenuity.
9  Homer-Dixon, 
notes four situations that constrain supply in response to increased demand: market 
failure, capital shortages in particular, social friction, and constraints on science.   
  Market failure occurs when the scarcity value of a good and other associated costs of use 
are not reflected in market prices due to poorly defined property rights, time lags, lack of 
information and uncertainty, etc.  Ingenuity may be further underprovided because of its 
non-rival, high exclusion cost nature, which requires institutional measures to rearrange 
incentives (e.g., administrative solutions – public provision and taxation; status – 
receiving public recognition or learning to value achievements outside of markets; 
contracts – designing contractual incentives to produce and apply ideas, such as patents 
(Schmid, 2004)).   
  Capital shortages are one type of market constraint that disrupts economic agents’ ability 
to make rational decisions about the allocation of resources.  Capital shortages can 
promote short-term planning and temporary immediate solution-oriented thinking rather 
than long-term adaptive planning for resource management.   
                                                 
9 Homer-Dixon focuses primarily on natural resource scarcity.  He further specifies that renewable resource 
scarcity requires more ingenuity than non-renewable scarcity due to the complex problems of non-
convexities, sudden shocks, tipping points, interactive effects within ecological systems, and uncertainty.  
In the case of irrigation in Mali, food scarcity, labor scarcity, and investment and finance scarcity also 
become complex problems that require social ingenuity.  Similar analyses in which institutional factors and 
knowledge production are endogenous to economic systems include cumulative-causation analysis and path 
dependency including Myrdal, North, and Hodgson among others.  
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  Social friction occurs when small interest groups organize themselves to influence 
institutions to redistribute wealth and property rights rather than to increase wealth and 
economic growth (Olson, 1982).  Scarcity and changes in relative prices can increase 
incentives to change institutions in ways that allow them to reassign the distribution of 
costs and benefits (North, 1990).  Homer-Dixon regards this as a shortfall of ingenuity. 
Special interests, however, also rely on ingenuity to solve problems through institutional 
reform, but benefits sought are often redistributive and not necessarily growth-oriented. 
  Science is constrained when there is a limited capacity to understand, apply, and build 
upon existing ideas.  This can occur when capital shortages and institutions result in 
constrained investment in education and research, if resource scarcity exacerbates the 
quantity and complexity of problems, or if social conflict moves discussion and 
investment away from science in order to advance special interests. 
Outside organizations can play a particularly important role when resource scarcity 
constrains the supply of ingenuity as a result of the above factors. 
Geoffrey Hodgson (1999) argues, “Production costs cannot be independent of 
social relations.”  In 1998, he explained, “prices are social conventions, reinforced by 
habits embedded in specific institutions… theories of price must be in part, a theory of 
ideas, expectations, habits, and institutions involving routines and processes of valuation” 
(Hodgson, 1998).  Ingenuity is not only a good stored by individuals but also 
accumulated and directed by governing organizations.  The capacity of organizations to 
encourage and guide ingenuity toward commonly-defined goals of productivity and 
problem solving is greater than the sum of their members’ contributions, and benefits are 
greater than simply reduced transaction costs.    
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Geoffrey Hodgson (1999) emphasizes the role of collective learning. “Learning is 
more than the acquisition of information; it is the development of the modes and means 
of calculation and assessment… the skills of workers and managers are enlarged as they 
learn.”  He quotes Winter (1988) as saying, “the learning experience is a shared 
experience of organizational members… thus even if the contents of the organization are 
stored only in the form of memory traces in the memories of individual members, it is 
still an organizational knowledge in the sense that the fragment stored by each individual 
member is not fully meaningful or effective except in the context provided by the 
fragments of the other members.”    
Costs are also influenced by how culture or informal institutions of an 
organization shape members preferences, beliefs and values for productivity and 
collaboration – particularly where formal institutions are weak.  Lam (2001) identifies a 
culture of trust and social cohesion as the distinguishing factor in Taiwanese irrigation 
organizations’ successful adaptation to rapid change in the 1990s.  Organizations 
amended institutions in order to eliminate perverse incentives and to align individual and 
collective interests despite the high fixed and high exclusion cost nature of investment in 
rule reform.  (Lam does not make recommendations for developing trust as the status quo 
where it does not yet exist.) 
Just as ingenuity can be used by special interests to alter institutions for 
redistributive gain in ways that reduce or slow growth, learning can also be 
counterproductive to achieving identified goals.  Groups can learn disempowerment or 
entitlement.  Similarly, where there is a learned expectation of continued government or 
NGO provision of services, financial independence may not be prioritized.  Decisions to  
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make cost-saving long-run investments can be hampered by the perception that a project 
will be discontinued or changed unexpectedly or if expectations of retaining land access 
are uncertain.  
Particularly in situations where change is occurring quickly and unpredictably, 
prioritizing investment in physical factors of production for prescriptive technological 
solutions over or without adequate attention to investment in the development of 
ingenuity could increase long-run costs and sacrifice system productivity and flexibility.  
Research is needed to understand better the role of social and technological ingenuity as 
complementary and sometimes substitute goods for financial investment in physical 
factors of production.  Research is also needed to understand/design decision-making and 
price institutions that provide better incentives for the development of ingenuity at an 
individual and organizational level.   
2.2.2  Decision Making:   The second and third cost questions - what and 
whose costs are recovered by prices and how those costs will be distributed – are 
determined by who is included in decision-making arrangements and how.  The design of 
the decision-making process in pricing strategies can have significant implications for 
total cost and benefit levels and can influence whether cost-recovery tactics undermine or 
advance the greater national objectives of poverty alleviation.  
Samuels and Schmid (1997) write, “The economy is a decision-making or choice 
process…Power is the effective participation in decision making to make one’s interests 
count when they conflict with others.”  The interaction between formal and informal 
institutions, particularly at the collective-choice level, determines the nature of different 
stakeholders’ participation in decision-making, and it is the nature of their involvement  
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that shapes the outcomes of decisions – in particular, which costs will be recovered by 
prices and how those costs will be distributed among beneficiaries of services.  The 
authors explain that stakeholders function together in an economic system with the 
following four elements: 
1.  Opportunity Sets:  available alternatives lines of action or choices, open to an individual, 
each with a relative opportunity cost.   
2.  Power: effective participation in decision making to make one’s interests count when 
they conflict with those of others; the means or capacity with which to exercise choice.    
3.  Coercion: impact of the behavior and choices of others upon the content of one’s 
opportunity set. 
4.  Working rules: rules of law, custom, morality, and so on, governing access to and use of 
power (formal and informal). 
The authors add that, “culture and power influence individual preferences, 
organizational preferences, and the creative activity that is either encouraged or 
prohibited.”  An analysis of how Malian cultural institutions influence pricing institutions 
is well beyond the scope of this paper, but many incentives and disincentives can be 
teased out of the pricing strategies by examining stakeholders relationships to one 
another.   
Non-cooperation or lack of creative effort can increase transaction costs and 
increase rates of resource depletion, deterioration, and misuse, thereby increasing 
physical transformation costs.  Baland and Platteau (1999) apply game theory to a series 
of regulated and unregulated common pool resource cases.  They find that as inequality 
increases, the cost to regulatory agencies to implement and enforce appropriation and  
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provision rules increases.  They note that exclusion of stakeholder groups can undermine 
the effectiveness of administrative and regulatory agencies, particularly if the 
marginalized groups are expected to cooperate with established rules and invest effort 
into common productivity goals.   
Meinzen-Dick et al. (2002) note that inadequate participation can increase project 
costs when nominal representation is used to pass on responsibilities without decision-
making rights or buy-in; also costs can increase when rights and responsibilities are 
devolved insufficient implementation capacity – this may be insufficient financial, 
informational or enforcement capacity.  
Participation in a decision-making process can be costly; results of participation 
can be positive, absent, or negative.  Rules can be designed to incentivize participation 
and protect participants from potential negative ramifications (even if the negative is 
simply the cost of participation measured against low prospects for positive gain).   
Finally rules can sometimes be designed to align competing interests’ to work toward the 
same goals. In this case, participation of all parties is particularly encouraged and often 
necessary for the rule structure to result in the desired performance of all parties.   
In both irrigation cases reviewed, certain aspects of the decision-making 
processes that determine costs and prices can be framed as principal-agent games in 
which there is a situation of necessary interdependence between a principal (or resource 
owner) and an agent (resource manager) who have objectives that are in conflict with one 
another.  Well-designed operational and procedural institutions can result in both 
principal and agent working toward the same goal to maximize their own gain (a perfect 
example of this is in the rule structure of the Garage Moderne in the second case study of  
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PPIVs).  In situations of significantly asymmetrical power, rule design may have to be 
combined with sufficient support (one-time or continuous) for disadvantaged parties to be 
able to act on rule-based incentives.  To properly design institutions and support 
programs, the sources and implications of asymmetrical power must be identified. 
Increasing agricultural productivity is a priority for advancing economic growth 
in rural-based economies like Mali.  Poverty reduction is largely assumed to result from 
rural economic growth (via trickle-down multiplier effects) or through targeted projects 
and safety-net policies and programs (Jayne et al. 2003).  Others authors argue that 
economic growth is a necessary but insufficient condition for poverty reduction, and that 
all stakeholders’ participation must be effectively mainstreamed into project design if 
poverty alleviation and fairness are to be institutionalized and result in long-run 
sustainable economic growth (Lam, 2001, van Koppen, 1998).   
Beck and Nesmith (2001) examine the relationship between vulnerable 
populations within communities and access to common pool resources (CPRs).   
Vulnerable populations are often most reliant on CPRs for their livelihoods, and they 
often have the least access to effective participation in making decisions.   
Marginalization can occur intentionally in an effort to redistribute rights and wealth or 
unintentionally due to bias; vulnerable groups can be marginalized because they lack 
specific skills (e.g., literacy and having colonial language skills) or because their 
knowledge, experiences and opinions are not respected.
10 
                                                 
10 Bina Agarwal (2001) finds that inadequate participation of women increases depletion of resources, 
increases costs of resource protection and rule enforcement, and reduces fairness or perceived fairness of 
rules.  Agarwal identifies factors that affected inequity as social perceptions and norms, rules of entry, and 
personal or household attributes and endowments.  She stresses that disempowering perceptions and beliefs 
held by the women and by those who excluded them were not always well founded, but that lack of  
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Jayne et al. (2001) find that community-driven approaches to development require 
serious attention to distribution of resources.  Their attempts to explain landholding size 
in five African countries using variables such as household size and assets - the formal 
criteria on which agricultural land is often distributed - did not demonstrate consistently 
strong explanatory power.  The authors identify local-level kinship ties and power 
relationships to be important factors in local governance decisions missed by their model.  
They note that such factors have implications for decentralization strategies that aim to 
reduce poverty and suggest transparency as an important area of focus.   
Institutions to promote transparency, however, may be insufficient if marginalized 
groups cannot use available information for purposes of upward accountability.   
Illiteracy, disempowerment, and lack of support from outside a locally corrupt system can 
all undermine effective use of available information.  Reversing this trend requires that 
development initiatives identify, target, and  mainstream these marginalized groups to 
develop their assets, negotiation skills, and enforcement/accountability options.   
                                                                                                                                                 
interactive participation opportunities reinforced such beliefs.  She finds that mandated inclusion of 




3  OVERVIEW OF IRRIGATION IN MALI 
 
  Section three provides a description the state of irrigation in Mali.  The section 
also identifies the national laws and policies that define objectives for public involvement 
in the agriculture sector and promotion of irrigated agriculture specifically.  This section 
is followed by the two Malian case studies, the Office du Niger, in section four and the 
case of small, irrigated village perimeters (PPIVs) in section five.  A description of price 
strategy components – price levels, price structure, and sanctions – is provided for each 
case along with analysis of relevant cost and decision related issues  
Mali is rich in water resources and economically dependent on agriculture 
production.  Benefiting from both the Senegal and Niger River Basins, a 1982 UNDP 
statistic is often cited indicating that 2.2 million hectares of land could be irrigated if the 
proper infrastructure were developed.  
This figure is misleading.  The true potential of land and water resources is 
unknown and would vary depending on the type of irrigation system used, on other land 
and water-use demands in Mali and in up and downstream countries, and on the 
agricultural practices applied.  The UNDP figure does not account for growing water 
demands in countries upstream and downstream from Mali or for minimum flows needed 
to maintain ecological services such as pollutant dilution and eutrophication prevention.  
As seasonal floods of the Niger crest later and lower each year, increasing productivity of 
diversions becomes more important and requires increased water control (ARD, 2002). 
It is generally agreed, however, that the estimated 418,313 currently-irrigated 
hectares in Mali represent only a fraction of the country’s irrigation potential.   
Additionally, agriculture on much of the land currently irrigated could be intensified to  
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increase yield per drop, yield per CFA franc (the regional currency), and yield per 
hectare. 
Mali is divided into four climatic zones and has three main approaches to water 
control.  The four climatic zones slice the country laterally, moving from the greatest 
rainfall in the south (two southern zones combined represent 18% of Mali’s land and 
have growing seasons of 160 days) to the least rainfall in the desert north (51% of Mali’s 
land, growing season less than 15 days).
11  The interior zone, which includes the inland 
delta of the River Niger, makes up 26% of the land in Mali and has a highly variable 
growing season (15 to 100 days).  The Office du Niger lies in the inland delta; the small, 
irrigated village perimeters (PPIVs) are located primarily along the Niger River in Mopti, 
Gao, and Tombouctou. 
Water-control technologies are classified by degree into four categories.  Both 
cases in this paper are considered total water control.  Total water control is one of the 
two priority approaches in the National Irrigation Development Strategy (SNDI) based on 
potential to deliver maximum increases in yield per hectare, yield per m
3 of water 
diverted, and poverty-reduction benefits.  
Irrigation has not been the anticipated productivity panacea, unfortunately.  The 
National Sub-Sector Strategy for Irrigation Development (1999) reports 60,000 of 
418,313 hectares of land with irrigation infrastructure have been abandoned due to 
deteriorated soils or infrastructure.  In 2004, nearly 16% of the smallest, most vulnerable 
landholders in the Office du Niger were permanently evicted from their parcels after a 
                                                 
11 Soudano Guinean, 6%, 1200 millimeters rain/year, growing season 160 days, rainfed agriculture; 
Soudanian, 12%, 600-1200 millimeters of rain/year, growing season 100-160, rainfed with irrigated 
supplementary agriculture; Sahelian, 26%, 200-600 millimeters rain/year, growing season 15-100 days, 
irrigation primary, rainfed supplementary; Saharan, 51%, less than 200 millimeters, growing season less 
than 15 days, irrigation necessary.  
  32
single uncharacteristically bad season.  Of approximately 1,600 hectares of land 
developed into PPIVs under a European Union/World Bank project, only 52% are 
currently operational; this project continues, nonetheless, to develop new perimeters to 
meet its 2007 goal of at least developing irrigation systems on 2,500 hectares. 
  A nation’s development plans can be analyzed at three levels – the vision, the 
strategies to achieve the vision, and the tactics to implement the strategy (Staatz, 1994).  
The National Sub-Sector Strategy for Irrigation Development (SNDI), written in April 
1999, is intended to “develop a coherent sub-sector strategy to guide national irrigation 
policy specifically and the use of water resources in general… in a manner compliant 
with national strategies for rural and agriculture development, accelerated economic 
growth, and poverty reduction” (p 5).  Specific implementation tactics are to be guided by 
the visions and strategies of sector development plans - the Rural Infrastructure 
Development Plan (2000), the Food Security Plan (2003), the National Environmental 
Plan (1998), and the Decentralization Mission (1993) specifically.   
SNDI strategic objectives are summarized as follows: 
•  The promotion of food security through increased sustainable irrigated 
agricultural production, particularly in the North, where rainfed production is not 
an option; 
•  Improvement of nutritional status of vulnerable populations, particularly women 
and children; 
•  Promotion of a rural economy oriented toward reducing agricultural imports and 
increasing agricultural exports; 
•  Rural income growth; 
•  Reduction of internal migration and emigration patterns.  
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The SNDI and World Bank/Government of Mali National Rural Infrastructure Program 
(PNIR), published in 2000, specifically address the issue of irrigation pricing.  The SNDI 
indirectly mandates financial cost-recovery pricing of system operations and maintenance 
by limiting the State’s investment role to one of supporting initial infrastructure 
investments where such investments surpass communes’ or irrigation users’ ability to pay 
(pp. 35-36).  Fees (at a minimum) are to recover operation and maintenance financial 
costs, and collection efforts are to be improved. 
SNDI Annex III cites an FAO study indicating that PPIVs are sufficiently 
profitable to allow 100% recovery of initial investments through irrigation fees; the same 
analysis shows ON farmers to have the financial capacity to pay 61-93% of land 
development or rehabilitation costs (it is not specified, but assumed that this refers to 
secondary and tertiary canal investment and land leveling costs). 
The SNDI details a plan for a system of “New Irrigation Fees.”  Fees are 
suggested to be 20% of the estimated minimum gross income per hectare for various 
perimeters throughout the country.  Fees are to be adjusted periodically according to 
changes in average yields and average paddy prices.
12  Line-item accounting for use of 
collected funds is encouraged but not mandated.   
The New Irrigation Fees are presented as a guideline for maximum fees 
chargeable based on ability to pay rather than cost of delivery.  Each perimeter is 
encouraged to negotiate actual fees applied.  When compared with fees being charged in 
existing perimeters, New Irrigation Fee guidelines all exceed current irrigation fee rates 
                                                 
12 This is based on the fact that the majority of irrigated land in Mali was used for rice production at the 
time the SNDI was drafted.  Crop diversification is an objective of the ON, and land there and in other 
perimeters is increasingly being used for crops including sugarcane, tomatoes, and onions.   
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(in the ON, suggested fees were 80,000 CFAF/ha and actual fees were 43,000 CFAF/ha 
in 1999).  No guidance is provided for situations in which costs exceed 20% of the 
minimum gross income per hectare. 
According to the SNDI, irrigation fees for PPIVs are to remain below 100,000 
CFAF/ha (in 1999 CFAF).  This figure was estimated to be the limit of farmers’ ability to 
pay and sufficient to cover all diesel motor pumps (groupe motopompe – GMPs, used to 
pump water from the Niger into river-side rice fields) and associated irrigation costs.  It 
was noted that PPIVs’ fees per season are easier to link to itemized costs per hectare and 
should therefore be set at the perimeter level. 
The PNIR targets irrigation investments toward the ON and PPIVs (through the 
National and Regional Directorates for Rural Works and Equipment - DNAER, 
DRAER).  With respect to pricing in the ON, the program mandates a shift of 
responsibility for primary infrastructure O&M costs from the State to ON farmers.  Half 
of these additional costs to farmers are to be recovered through higher irrigation fees and 
the other 50% through new fees collected from expanded perimeters.  Small-scale ON 
farmers are expected to pay for tertiary development costs and any necessary pump 
equipment (primarily used in the dry season by vegetable farmers); medium and large-
scale investors are to cover secondary and tertiary canal development costs – requiring an 
estimated 12% increase in productivity per hectare.   
PNIR Phase I did not outline explicit pricing guidelines for PPIVs.  Partner 
NGOs were to establish pilot cost-recovery based pricing along with capacity /institution-
building programs for local irrigation decision makers.  
  35
4  CASE 1:  THE OFFICE DU NIGER 
The Office du Niger (ON), or Niger River Authority, is located in central Mali’s 
inner delta, a large alluvial flood plain of the Niger River.  When originally planned, in 
1929, the project was to irrigate over a million hectares.  Today, conservative estimates 
put the upper limit closer to 200,000 hectares.  Currently, the canals of the Office irrigate 
70,682 hectares during the growing season (2004). 
In the late 1980s, the Government of Mali and international donors embarked 
on a mission to take the colonial-era parastatal in disarray and transform it into a 
proverbial ricebasket for West Africa.  At the time, yields per hectare were steadily 
falling and farmers were abandoning salinized and otherwise degraded parcels. 
During the Structural Adjustment-era reforms, donors insisted on 100% cost-
recovery pricing for the costs of O&M on primary and secondary canals and land 
administration, with at least 98% collection rates.  Farmers’ exchanged acceptance of rate 
increases for increased transparency regarding management’s use of collected fees (Aw 
and Diemer, unpublished).  Farmers gained the right to participate in certain maintenance 
decisions and gained greater tenure security; officially, only non-payment of irrigation 
fees or non-cultivation of the plot results in eviction.   
The Government of Mali (GOM) relinquished total control over the ON, 
developing it into a quasi-independent administrative authority to be governed by a State-
ON-farmer contract-plan (CP) that governs the water pricing strategy among other rules.  
A number of factors contributed to production increases of 200-300% per 
hectare in many zones  (zones are the administrative districts of the ON; there are six).  
Among them were extensive institutional reforms in the ON and financing of network  
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expansion and rehabilitation launched in the 1980s.  Rice marketing reforms and the 1994 
devaluation both contributed to an increased profitability of production, which generated 
incentives to intensify production.  Average parcel size declined dramatically, falling 
from 4 to 2 ha between 1995-2002 as the population nearly doubled in the same seven 
years; in 2002, 34% of farmers held less than 2 hectares, and increasingly parcels of less 
than .5 hectare are being distributed (Fall, et al. 2004).
13  Intensification and double 
cropping (growing in both the rainy and dry seasons) have counteracted some income 
effects of the shrinking average parcel sizes. 
Current objectives of the Office du Niger include intensification of production 
per hectare, extension of the network, diversification of production – currently dominated 
by rice – poverty reduction, increased dry-season production, and increased private 
investment according to the ON Etude du Schema Directeur (2002). 
4.1  Pricing Objective 
The Office du Niger charges all farmers on ON land a redevance eau, translated 
as the water fee.  Although it is called the water fee, payment buys access to land, water, 
and water delivery.
14  The primary objective of the ON irrigation fee is to recover select 
financial costs of the irrigation system.  Bi-annual reports on the fee continually identify 
the need to implement demand management incentives.  Excessive water use can reduce 
crop productivity, increases O&M costs, and limits potential expansion of the network, 
resulting in higher price levels per hectare.
                                                 
13 Even given these small parcel sizes, distribution of land is based on criteria that are intended to distribute 
land to farmers with the greatest means for production such as family size and productive assets. 
14 For consistency with the rest of the paper, it is referred to as the irrigation fee.    
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4.2  Price level 
Total fees collected must equal total costs to be recovered.  Total costs are divided 
among farmers using the price structure (3.3.3).  A reassessment of costs to be recovered 
is conducted before the renewal of each two-year Contract-Plan.  Financial costs to be 
recovered by the irrigation redevance include the costs of operation and maintenance 
(O&M) of primary and secondary canals, certain pest control costs, certain administration 
costs, and other costs as determined by ON-Farmer Joint Committees for the 
Management of Funds for Secondary Canal Maintenance (CPGFE - receives and 
manages 50% of collected funds).  O&M for certain primary structures such as the main 
Markala Dam are excluded because of their large capacity relative to the actual number 
of hectares served.  Fixed costs and infrastructure depreciation are excluded from the 
irrigation fee to avoid farmers’ claim to ownership of the system the implications of 
which would complicate parcel evictions.
15  Depreciation of machinery purchased for 
maintenance work is included.   
In 2004, the highest fee per hectare was worth approximately 0.4 tons of rice.  
Irrigated yields were approximately 6 t/ha; without irrigation, average yields were 3 t/ha.  
By these rough figures, the value added from using irrigation services on average 
                                                 
15 Land tenure arrangements are usufruct rights granted for one, 30, 50, or an indeterminate number of 
years.  Plots can be inherited or divided by user, but cannot be legally leased or sold.  Eviction is allowed 
on the basis of non-payment of irrigation fees or non-cultivation. Problems with non-maintenance of 
tertiary canals are to be dealt with by organizing tertiary canal committees.  The contract states that non-
contribution to these committees will be dealt with by eviction, but this is a debated policy since most 
benefits would be from improved drainage but even these effects would be limited since secondary 
drainage is not well maintained.  No land use fees are paid to the ON distinctly from irrigation fees.  Rights 
to ON housing are permanent even if evicted from plot.  Illegal land leasing takes place fairly openly.  
Because the scarcity value of the land and the value of negative externalities resulting from intensification 
are not included in the water use fee, demand for plots exceeds supply (it is worth noting that the scarcity 
value of land in part a function of the price of access to land, which is related to the redevance itself in this 
case.  
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surpasses the price of irrigation services (by 2.6 tons/ha).  The cost-benefit margins vary 
by farmer and by land and irrigation service quality.  They also vary by year, as input 
costs and output prices change significantly from year to year depending on ON and 
farmer coop marketing and purchasing practices, transportation issues, farmer’s access to 
credit and storage, and world/regional prices.  Farmers who have access to credit, storage, 
education, and better land will consistently have an advantage over those whose access is 
limited.
16 
Variation notwithstanding, consultant, donor, and state research shows the 
irrigation price levels above to be feasible in terms of average ability-to-pay and in terms 
of cost recovery (ECOFOR-SARL, 2004, 1999, 2002, 2004, Gaddis, 2002, Francois, 
2004, Fall, et al. 2004).  There is no crop risk insurance or well-defined emergency 
system for events of below-average productivity.  Bills are distributed at the end of the 
growing season, and payment, in cash, is due within six months.   
4.3  Price structure 
The structure of the ON irrigation fee determines the distribution of total costs 
among different classifications services provided.  The ON fee is a function of certain 
O&M costs, season (rainy or dry, reflecting water scarcity), the crop cultivated (rice or 
other, reflecting estimated consumptive water use), the class of land irrigated as 
determined by its level of network rehabilitation (I-III, reflecting value added).  Fees do 
not vary by distance from road, by zone, by soil/land quality, or by quantity of water 
used.  Starting in 2005, class I growing season fees will be the base fee (100%) and fees 
for all others classifications will be set as a relative percentage.  
                                                 
16 That there is a waiting list for distribution of all classes of land and that farmers are willing to farm 
informally out of network (where there is abandoned or no network yet) indicates potential profitability of 
parcels.  
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Fee = f (Costs, Season, Crop, Land Class) 
As a result, there are seven fees paid per hectare.  Below are these fees for the years 
2001-2007. 
 
Table 1  Irrigation Fees (CFAF/Hectare) 
17 
 
Although water stays in the canal system all year, only 20-30% of farmers are guaranteed 
enough water to gravity irrigate in the dry season.  These farmers must pay the ‘contre 
saison’ or dry-season fee.  Other farmers may be notified at the last minute that they will 
receive off-season irrigation services; they pay only if they elect to plant.  In the rest of 
the network, dry season canal water levels remain too low to irrigate by gravity 
(Coulibaly, 2004).  Women and children often use a portion of men’s land to bucket-
irrigate small vegetable patches during the dry season.  Fees for small off-season 
vegetable gardens are often not assessed or collected due to high information costs.   
Vegetable gardens that are formally maintained year-round (usually by women’s 
associations) are charged by prices in the table above.  There is exceptional confusion 
                                                 
17 Contat-Plan, Etat/Office du Niger/Exploitants Agricoles, 2002/2004.  Office du Niger.  Contract-Plan 
2005-2007 had not been approved at the time of research for this paper.  Figures here are those suggested 
by consultant in October 2004. 
Fee Classification  2001-2002  2002-2003  2003-2005  2005-07 
Class I (rehabilitated network) 
Rice Growing Season 













Class II (partially rehabilitated network) 
Rice Growing Season 













Class III (non-rehabilitated & land out of 
canal network ‘hors casier’) 
Rice Growing Season 

















Off Season Fee (all classes, all crops)  6 350  6 350  6 350  6 700  
  40
among users and officials regarding who has to pay dry-season fees and under what 
conditions; the implementation of these rules may also vary from zone to zone.
18 
4.4  Sanctions 
The formal sanctioning system is fairly straightforward on paper.  Farmers can be 
evicted from their land under three conditions.  The first is for failure to produce.  This 
does not refer to a poor production year but rather to farmers who do not cultivate their 
land.  The second is in the event of illegal land leasing or sale.  This rule is not enforced 
uniformly; leasing is widely and openly practiced, for the most part, with impunity.
19  
The third way to be evicted is through failure to pay the redevance.  This has recently 
been expanded to include failure to pay tertiary fees as defined by organizations for 
tertiary network users (OERTs); tertiary-fee sanctions have not yet been implemented.   
Enforcement of sanctions is not uniform.  Monitoring and collection 
(enforcement) costs are high for farmers on the smallest parcels and those out of the canal 
network (hors casiers) but required to pay for access to canal water (Bolly, 2004, 
Coulibaly, 2004, Ly, 2004).
20  At the same time, enforcement of other rules, particularly 
                                                 
18 Everyone I spoke with had a different reason for why dry season production was low, including poorly 
developed markets for non-rice outputs, misunderstandings about what fees would have to be paid, lack of 
resources/skills to produce non-rice crops, market constraints for non-rice inputs, etc.  
19 The Chinese company COVEC has a formal but illegal system of leasing land, which includes issuance 
of written contracts.  It is tolerated by the ON administration.  Individual farmers, particularly unionists, 
face greater risks of eviction from leasing. 
20 The ON defines users as those having formal permission to farm on ON canal-served lands.  A number of 
users do not have formal land use rights but irrigate impromptu fields on undeveloped lands near secondary 
drainage canals, “pirating” water to their informal networks.  The improper land development accelerates 
soil degradation and can have negative impacts on legally connected perimeters from blocked drainage 
canals.  By developing a new class of users called ‘hors casiers’, or the ‘out of network’ user category, the 
ON has attempted to mitigate two problems.  Users gained some level of land security, giving them an 
increased incentive to maintain the soils and invest in the development of tertiary canals and drainage.  
Second, the ON is able to exact a fee from the new class of users, which brings them under control of 
official ON rules and regulations, helps to pay O&M costs, and cover some planning expenses.  Farmers 
pay fees in anticipation of maintaining usufruct rights in the event of canal extension.  
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the national law prohibiting land leasing and rental, is not applied to large-holder 
investors.
21 
Graduated sanctions do not exist.  If a farmer pays only part of the irrigation fees 
owed, he or she is evicted from the entire holding.  If it is the first year of non-or partial-
payment in ten years, total eviction still holds.  Formal credit markets are largely non-
existent for small holders (land cannot be used as collateral), and renting land is illegal.  
A single bad year can easily result in eviction.  As a result, the poorest farmers are at the 
highest risk in the event of household or perimeter-level shocks (they are often the least 
able to recover from or adapt to them because of limited skills and assets).   
Farmers’ unions put forth two proposals for alternate graduated sanction 
institutions for the Contract-Plan 2005-2007 that would also guard against financial 
losses for the Office (SEXAGON, 2004).  No changes were made, but it was agreed that a 
study would be conducted on the general problem of evictions (ECOFOR-SARL, 2004).   
Criteria for exactly what constitutes an emergency or exception to fee payments 
are not standardized.  Defining such criteria could reduce the role of power and politics in 
defining solutions at the time of subsequent emergencies and increase farmers’ ability to 
plan for and respond to such events. 
While the Contract-Plan assigns rights and responsibilities to each of the three 
signatories, only farmers are held accountable for fulfillment under threat of sanction.  
                                                 
21 COVEC is a Chinese firm established in the ON under agreement between the GOM and the Chinese 
government.  Development of new secondary networks for the project was financed by the GOM and 
donors as low interest loans.  COVEC hands out leasing contracts to renters.  This is illegal by national law, 
but accepted at the headquarters level in the ON and by the GOM.  The World Bank is also experimenting 
with an official land-titling project called Koumana under the PNIR that would result in land purchasing 
and sale rights for large investors.   
Comment: I changed the wording 
because the previous wording implied 
that land cannot be used as collateral 
because formal credit markets are non-
existent.  It is likely that one of the 
reasons the formal credit markets don’t 
exist is precisely because there is no way 
to use land as collateral.  Thus, the 
causality runs the opposite direction as 
that implied in the original wording. 
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No formal system of upward accountability of sanctioning exists for partial or non-
fulfillment of State or ON responsibilities.  
Post-reform collection rates were reportedly 95-98% of due funds (not of farmers 
making payment) through the late 1990s (Aw and Diemer, 2002).  But in 2002, rates of 
on-time payment ranged between 83% for growing-season rice fields and 18% for off-
season rice production.  According to the 2004 study on ON pricing that is used to inform 
the process of setting new Contrat-Plan redevance rates, in some zones, growing-season 
payments rates were as low as 71% (BRLi, 2004).
22  The Office unofficially allows time 
beyond the six-month deadline for payment; but eviction rates are high.  In 2001, the ON 
reclaimed 604 hectares through evictions, in 2002 - 279 hectares, in 2003 – 21 ha, and in 
2004 – 5,103 ha were reclaimed through the eviction of 16% or 4,222 of the 26,435 ON 
farmers in that year alone (Fall, et al. 2004).  Considering farmers’ families, the number 
of people affected by evictions could easily have surpassed 50,000.  See Appendix II for 
more information about the eviction situation of 2003-2004. 
 
4.5  Costs and Decision Making 
Decision making and decision makers are described at each of three levels of 
irrigation committee management related to pricing and costs – the bargaining and design 
of the ON-wide Contract-Plan, the secondary canal network, and the tertiary canal 
network levels.  This is followed by a description of stakeholders and the incentives they 
face to improve the ON’s ability to meet its objectives. 
                                                 
22 Figure represents the percentage of funds collected.  The percentage of farmers paying redevance is 
much lower.  Those farmers who do not pay are those who hold small plots, and the cost of collecting fees 
from those who hold only fractions of a hectare has been too high in the past to warrant systematic 
collection efforts from them.  Discussion among ON officials indicates that efforts to collect from or evict 
farmers with small holdings will be increasing.  
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Contract-Plan.  Decisions regarding what costs are to be recovered by 
irrigation fees are formally made for the entire ON during negotiations Contrat-Plan 
(CP), officially by the Advisory Council.  The Advisory Council is formally made up of 
representatives from the three partner entities, the GOM, the ON administration, and the 
elected farmers’ representatives.  Possible changes to the price structure and fee levels are 
discussed in these negotiations.  No structural changes have been made for at least the 
past two contracts (four years).   
The two farmer representatives on the Council are selected from and by the 
zone-level farmer delegates who are elected by farmers (three delegates per zone).  An 
independent consulting firm studies the situation before each Contract-Plan (2005-2007 
will be the fourth CP since reforms) and meets with all stakeholder groups before making 
suggestions for the following Contract-Plan.  Suggestions are to be discussed, bargained, 
and voted on by the Advisory Council.   
Contract-Plan discussions include dozens of non-signatory stakeholders, 
including representatives from both farmers’ union and various donors (World Bank, 
IMF, USAID, EU, AFD among others).  They do not include official representatives 
from the commercial large-holder business community.  Discussions are held in French, 
for the benefit of visiting donors and the consultants.  Translators are not provided for 
elected farmer representatives.  Consultant reports are in French and based on data 
produced by the ON.  No rules exist with respect to the advanced distribution of 
bargaining materials, such as the consultant’s report or that it be translated; this adds to 
farmer representatives’ bargaining disadvantage and increased information costs.  
  44
Bargaining is largely shaped by what topics go on the agenda and the content of 
the consultant reports.  Investment alternatives and pricing options are framed by ideas 
presented in the consultant reports.   Using consultants rather than the ON to frame the 
debate within the report is designed to provide an element of objectivity to the report.    
The GOM and farmers can either accept that all discussion is based on the 
consultant report content or they can challenge how questions are answered by the report 
and even which questions are asked.  Their ability to challenge the report-led agenda 
shapes the level on which each party is bargaining.  One unionist aimed to accomplish 
this at the C-P meeting when he protested a portion of the redevance increase that was to 
pay for an ON staff pay raise.  This was an automatic cost-of-living increase that was not 
on the agenda for debate.  The unionist pointed out, however, that farmers would 
effectively be taking pay cut to give the ON staff a pay increase.  This comment, among 
others, was made but not discussed or included in ‘official’ version of meeting notes, 
which, when compared to the proceedings, seemed to reflect the relative weight of 
different parties’ voices.   
A history of adversarial relationships and corruption seems to contribute to 
extensive mistrust among Advisory Council parties, illustrating how organizational 
learning can also have negative effects on productivity and functionality of an 
organization.  Hostilities and disrespect were voiced openly and privately between all 
parties at various times.  This is not likely to change until the staff of the ON, most of 
whom has been with the organization since pre-reform years, turns over.  Similarly, union 
leaders must take on a more proactive rather than defensive role; the ON staff actively 
opposes this role change for the union, however.   
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Secondary Canal Networks. At the secondary canal level, Farmer-ON 
committees for secondary network maintenance funds (Comité Paritaire de Gestion des 
Fonds d’Entretien du Réseau Hydraulique Secondaire - CPGFE) make spending 
decisions on secondary network O&M costs using 50% of the fees collected from the 
relevant secondary network.  Elected farmers are responsible for working with zone-level 
administrative officials to bid contracts, prioritize projects, and to ensure expenditure 
accountability.  This committee also proposes evictions (for any reason outside of non-
payment of fees) and will evaluate fields in the case of extensive destruction from natural 
causes (CPGFE is allowed to excuse 1% of fees per season).  
The secondary network land management committee (Comité Paritaire de 
Gestion des Terres - CPGT) implements evictions and land distribution at the zone level 
and has at least one representative from a farmers’ organization.  Committees for water 
management (Comité de Partiteur - CPE) are to monitor secondary network maintenance 
implemented by the CPGFE and assure that farmers are conducting sufficient O&M at 
the tertiary level.  The CPE has the official right to propose evictions; again, there is at 
least one representative from farmers’ organizations on this committee.   
Tertiary Canal Networks.  Maintenance of tertiary canals and land is the 
responsibility of growers; appropriate maintenance at tertiary level is connected to O&M 
costs at secondary level.  The 2002-2004 ON Contract-Plan mandated the existence of a 
tertiary network maintenance fee to be collected and managed by OERTs, Organizations 
for Farmers of Tertiary Networks.  Nearly 9000 OERTs were formally established in 55 
villages between the 2003-2004 growing seasons; their level of functionality was  
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questioned by the BRLi consultants, USAID contractors in the area, and the President of 
SEXAGON.  
Maintenance of secondary canals affects the costs of tertiary maintenance.   
Discussion to link the CPGFE farmer representation officially to OERT representatives 
has been rejected by the ON for the past two CPs, purportedly out of concern that farmers 
will gain too much control relative to the ON representatives (François, 2004).   
Additional complications arise because the ON guarantees water delivery to farmers in 
exchange for fee payment.  If tertiary O&M is left completely to farmers, the provision of 
water to some fields may be blocked by poor tertiary O&M on neighboring fields.  It is 
unclear if the blocked farmer could legally withhold payment of fees to the ON.  
Similarly, while it is clear that the ON can charge farmers the cost of tertiary 
O&M if it is not properly performed, it is not clear that farmers have the right, much less 
the capacity, to force ON payment when secondary drainage canals result in premature 
deterioration of tertiary networks, or parcel degradation (primarily as a result of 
salinization), a problem for most zones.  Adding to the complication of assigning various 
agents’ responsibility for maintenance is the fact that the physical relationships among 
network levels in disrepair in terms of how investment or neglect in one area may 
physically influence the rate of deterioration of canals in other areas of the network.  The 
level of effort and knowledge applied to maintenance tasks may vary greatly and has 
short-run and long-run effects on various parts of the irrigation system that may or may 
not be known, much less measured.  
Prices and Costs.  The choice of initial infrastructure at each irrigation level 
has a direct effect on the nature and distribution of long-run O&M costs (Figure 2,  
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below).  For example, initial infrastructure design and building may be costly for one 
type of canal (paid by the ON, donors, or the GOM), but long-run O&M costs to the user 
will be lower.  In other cases, such as below, fixed costs may actually be lower for canals 
that also have lower O&M costs.  Alternatively, the ON may choose less expensive 
investments, however, passing on the cost of savings to the farmers in the long run.  For 
example, deciding not to apply expensive laterite coverings to dykes during construction 
reduces fixed costs but can increase annual O&M costs by 30% according to BRLi 
research conducted for the 2002-2004 CP.  Unofficial payoffs, friendships/past business 
agreements among contractors and ON officials, and standard operating procedures all 
weigh into individual decisions incentives when new canals are planned.  High costs are 
associated with changing the status quo and individuals in the ON have no incentive to 
take on those costs for change.  
 
Figure 2:  Comparison of O&M costs of two tertiary canal construction types in the ON with equal water-
carrying capacity (water evaporation costs not considered).  Canal on the left was machine-dug by a large 
private contractor; O&M is 286 CFAF/yr/million liters water delivered.  Canal on the right was dug by 
hand with employment benefits accruing to local families; O&M is 170 CFAF/yr/million liters of water 
delivered.  Source:  Etude de l’Entretien des Reseaux Primaires, Secondaires, et Tertiaires et du Calcul du 




Increased investment in regular O&M can also lower total physical costs by 
reducing periodic and long-run O&M and rehabilitation costs.  Organization of an 
adequate management system and capacity building for users at secondary and tertiary 
levels are non-physical but real costs of production that are not addressed or are given 
secondary priority in the allocation of collected funds.  Allocating funds to such 
intangible management and organization costs is more challenging from a decision-
making perspective than spending funds on easily definable physical factors of 
production.  Such decisions are usually made at the ON or zone level largely by ON 
professionals who face no performance-based incentives and may not see the benefits of 
irrigation management transfer or more likely be threatened by such decentralization of 
decision making.   
The nature of individuals’ participation in the decision-making process is shaped 
by the incentives they face, their real and perceived choice set, and the means at their 
disposal to acquire information, bargain effectively and enforce contracts.  Below, each 
of the major participants involved in the design and implementation of the price strategy 
is analyzed with respect to their relative incentives, perceptions, and means to influence 
the price strategy.  Participants reviewed include ON officials, smallholder farmers, 
largeholder farmers and private investors, the Government of Mali, and donors. 
ON Officials have largely been with the ON since before structural reform – 
making them a wealth of collective of information but also a repository of ingrained 
perspectives and opinions about farmers, agriculture, and approaches to development.  
ON officials view discussion of lower prices or changes in sanction rules as a zero-sum 
game in which revenues would be lost to the ON and lower productivity condoned.  ON  
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officials are accountable collectively (but not individually) to donors to generate high 
cost-recovery and productivity-per-hectare statistics; poverty research is not part of 
annual ON reporting.   
The farmer–ON relationship is similar to the principal-agent problem.  The ON 
(agent) retains most of the specialized knowledge about various irrigation system 
performances and options, it is at an advantage over farmers (principals) who must rely 
on them to invest effort into irrigation system design.  This results in a problem of moral 
hazard in which the quality to which the ON chooses to meet its contractual duties is not 
readily  (or inexpensively) observable by the farmer or the GOM.   
Even if this information were available, farmers have no formal institutional 
means to hold the ON accountable for providing quality services.  Furthermore, they have 
no alternative service provider; the ON has a monopoly on provision of irrigation 
services to farmers.  This results in asymmetrical information and asymmetrical power.   
Individual ON officials have an incentive to maintain or increase fees to comply 
with donor demands of balanced budget, but they have little incentive to invest effort or 
ingenuity into addressing eviction problems or cost-reduction strategies.  Higher costs 
simply require higher fees.  Increasing eviction rates, increasing poverty, and/or 
increasing farmer organizing, may be among the indicators of when this approach to 
balancing fees and costs reaches its limits of feasibility.  Pushing these limits may also 
result in making farming feasible only for those producers with the skills and financial 
capital to significantly increase yields per hectare.
23  External funding for new projects is 
generally based on assumed or reported project costs, which are estimated by consultants 
                                                 
23 This, of course, re-introduces the question of how less productive farmers and their families will earn an 
income since food security requires both production and purchasing power.   
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or ON officials (as opposed to providing funding based on expected benefits).     
Accordingly, farmers have no way to ensure that fee increases will result in better service 
provision or that their own efforts to reduce costs will result in reduced fees rather than 
be invested in some other system cost (including ON officials’ salaries, as was the 2004 
proposal). 
The principal-agent problem is reversed at the local level, where the ON 
(principal) must rely on thousands of small farmers (agents) to invest in proper farming, 
water use, and O&M practices to maintain tertiary canals.  In some ways, this reflects 
moral hazard (the ON cannot ensure that the farmers are maintaining their parcels 
properly).  The OERT system is an attempt to address the moral hazard dilemma and 
create incentives for farmers to invest adequate effort at the tertiary level to reduce total 
costs.  Alone, however, it may be insufficient if farmers do not also have the means to 
coordinate properly among themselves and related secondary network efforts, if land 
rights are perceived to be insecure, or if system-wide cost savings that result are not 
reflected in fees paid or may be nullified by poor O&M at the secondary level.   
Various comments made at the 2004 CP discussion forum indicated that officials 
believed smallholder farmers to be incapable of making decisions, but were included in 
the decision-making process only because donors mandated it, and that time and 
resources spent informing farmers was largely wasted.  For example, farmers requested 
funds (approximately $50 per zone representative, a total request of $600) for gas to 
distribute and discuss CP proposals among farmers in their respective zones (reducing 
farmers’ information disadvantage and increasing representatives’ bargaining power in 
the CP).  The idea was discouraged.  The Chairwoman responded by explaining that such  
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funding would require an additional increase in the redevance and by following up with 
the comment that the farmers would not be able to understand the information, so why 
bother?  While she apologized for the comment, such comments indicate an informal 
institution of marginalizing farmers’ contributions to the system.  Accordingly, the 
request was not included in the summary of the meeting. 
Smallholder farmers comprise a large diverse group, making a unified vision 
more difficult to define and advocate and making intra-group communication and 
decision-making more costly.  Part of the heterogeneity is reflected in variable education 
and wealth levels.  Low education levels exacerbate cash poverty by decreasing farmers’ 
ability to identify and evaluate available options, increasing information and bargaining 
costs.  They are an additional bargaining disadvantage because they have no option to 
exit the system.  In the end, they will always have to agree to and follow the contract plan 
regardless of its design. 
Farmer unionization began in response to a history of farmer marginalization and 
the obstacles to individual effective participation.  Currently, there are two farmer unions 
in the ON:  the more independent Sydicat des Exploitants Agricoles de l’ON 
(SEXAGON) and Syndicat des Agriculteurs du Delta Central (SYNADEC), which was 
created in 1998 with the support of the ON, approximately one year after the inception of 
SEXAGON (Benoît, 2004). 
Individual and collective/organizational learning is likely to occur as farmers 
become more autonomously educated about ON issues and as networks among them 
develop through union activity.  This is occurring through the implementation of the 
government decentralization plan, through the growth of the unions, and through the  
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proliferation of radios and cell phones.  Each of these events reduces the cost of 
information but also facilitates learning.  As the process advances, farmers are likely to 
change beliefs about their own rights, responsibilities, and capacities; ON officials may 
also learn new attitudes if farmers begin to organize effective collectives, and improve 
their ability to articulate demands to the ON, to newspapers, and to other government 
offices (Fall, et al. 2004). 
Change often involves conflict, however, as power balances shift.   This transition 
can be particularly costly in the short run for the disadvantaged groups gaining power, 
making it difficult to change the status quo.  Conflict has arisen between the ON and 
primarily SEXAGON (84% of union farmers).  SEXAGON is invited to ON meetings 
occasionally, and efforts are underway to formally limit its rights to organize input or 
output market services (Atelier, 2004).  External support or rules that formally 
institutionalize the unions’ invitation to and participation in meetings and bargaining may 
reduce the meeting-by-meeting political decisions of if and how SEXAGON should 
participate, reducing some of the transaction costs to farmer advocates. 
High eviction rates can undermine the union’s ability to organize by increasing 
farmers’ perceived or actual costs of participation in the union – particularly as eviction 
rules are enforced by the ON selectively.  High eviction rates can reduce individual and 
organizational learning opportunities.  Research is needed to understand the effects of 
these evictions better – where the evicted farmers go and what they do, what kinds of 
people are re-allocated the eviction parcels, and if new parcel-holders are more or less 
productive.  Government plans to support private investment in a sugarcane farm and 
processing plant and a tomato processing and canning plant could provide limited off- 
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farm employment.  For the limited number of farmers who will access to these jobs, the 
work could provide seasonal income that could reduce eviction rates (if income were to 
help farmers mitigate seasonal risk) or serve as alternative means of income in the event 
of eviction.   
Largeholder farmers or private investors operating in the ON bargain directly 
with the ON or through donors and have no formal representation on the Advisory 
Council.  Because the ON, GOM, and donors are interested in promoting private 
investment and commercial farms, investors have made formal and informal exceptions 
to operational and collective action rules for their benefit.
24  The number of investors is 
increasing due to external and internal pressures and incentives.  No one on the CP 
committee represented largeholder interests.  New institutions are needed to address 
formally the issues facing smallholder farmers as distinct from those of private 
investment farming.  Transparency in large private investor-ON negotiations is also 
needed. 
The Government of Mali is represented primarily through  the Ministry of 
Agriculture, which is the office responsible for the State’s participation in the ON as a CP 
signatory.   To some degree, it faces the same moral hazard problems with the ON as the 
farmers face.  There are important differences between the GOM and the farmers in terms 
of the effects of the moral hazard in terms its impact on bargaining power and goal 
achievement.  Different from the farmers, the GOM, particularly the Ministry, can speak 
                                                 
24 The World Bank’s Koumana project is an example of formal experimentation with allocating land rights 
to private investors who were willing to invest in the fixed costs of land and irrigation network 
development.  COVEC is doing the same type of experiment in practice but does not have the formal right 
to lease its land.  USAID required that a significant portion of US-funded, newly irrigated parcels be 
allocated to private investors despite research illustrating private investors’ ability to pay for secondary 
irrigation-infrastructure development (Schema Directeur, 2002).  
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with a unified voice and does not also incur the cost of organizing and education that 
farmers face.  Furthermore, the Ministry has relatively significant resources at its disposal 
to read published reports, request statistics from the ON, and while it does not have the 
option to choose a different service provider, it can make effective threats to budgets and 
individual employees if need be.   
It is not certain that the GOM has much of an incentive to develop an irrigation 
program with a focus on poverty reduction rather than squarely on revenue generation, 
however, nor is it certain that the GOM is taking steps to ensure that the two objectives 
are not competing.   Ministry officials are responsible to elected officials (formally) and 
to large donors (formally and informally).  Backed by donors, the government is heavily 
promoting private investment, particularly foreign private investment, in the ON.  Union-
Ministry discussions were held to address recent eviction problems, but Ministry officials 
eventually revoked their support for fee reductions or fee level freezes (Coulibaly, 2004, 
Keita, 2004, Fall, et al. 2004).  Some GOM and ON officials maintain that enforced 
evictions and prioritization of private investment are acceptable costs to advance long-run 
objectives of poverty alleviation through non-farm employment growth. 
Donors  play both an internal and external role in the process of institutional 
change and in shaping the system performance outcomes of the established operational 
and collective choice rules.  Changes in donor objectives and development project trends 
affect the demands that donors place on governments explicitly or implicitly.  Currently, 
the trend includes a focus on increasing private investment in the ON as a strategy to 
increase off-farm labor opportunities (plans for sugarcane and tomato processing plants 
were both cited frequently as potential large employers), to increase land productivity  
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through improved application of new technologies, and to decrease government 
expenditure on canal investments.  High eviction rates were not viewed as a priority 
problem in terms of issues discussed in the CP meeting. 
Donors’ beliefs about farmers’ potential contribution to decision making and 
capacity to participate interactively in decision making influences how and which 
projects are designed and implemented.  Because donors are not accountable to the ON, 
GOM, or to Malian public opinion, they have significant political space to demand 
formal changes that could also promote positive informal change.  This would entail 
advocating policies and programs that improved the balance of power among the three 
CP signatories in terms of providing appropriate and timely training, education, and 
information - all of which would improve the bargaining process.   
4.6  Office du Niger Conclusions 
The ON price strategy is designed for meeting the tactical objective of cost-
recovery.  It may not be well designed to meet the objectives of advancing the 
sustainability and productivity of the agriculture sector as a strategy for poverty reduction 
and food security.   
Changing the standard operating procedures for designing, approving, and 
implementing CP spending and price setting requires a shift in the current established 
culture of interactions among agents; both formal rules and informal rules of operating 
need to change.  The current status quo is defined by diverse stakeholder groups of 
different sizes, with different goals, with learned perceptions about rights and 
responsibilities, and who face power and information asymmetries.  As a result, even 
though entire groups should benefit from seeing improved cost-efficiencies in irrigation  
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system management, there are weak institutional incentives for the individuals who 
comprise the groups to take on the costs and responsibilities associated with making the 
necessary changes in the status quo.  Short-term costs of change (learning, risk, 
information) are high and the payoffs are uncertain and diffuse in the long term (as was 
made clear by the evictions and arrests in 2004).  This is particularly true for small 
farmers who do not have the option to risk loss of land for political activities that yield 
uncertain and payoffs.  Reforms that come are slow and iterative. 
Over the past fifteen years, as small farmers’ perceived benefits decreased, as 
their sense of capacity and entitlement increased, and as attitudes about rights and 
responsibilities began to change with other reforms taking place in the ON system and in 
the country, farmers overcame some of the disincentives to organize and initiated a union 
whose primary role to date seems to be leveraging public opinion and drawing public 
attention to issues such as price levels and sanctioning institutions.  SEXAGON 
leadership aims to move into a position to serve farmers’ physical production needs (bulk 
purchase of seed, fertilizer, etc.) and be institutionally legitimized by the ON through 
formally institutionalized recognition in bargaining and advocacy.  This would advance 
its capacity to serve as a farmer advocate within the system, to support voting delegates, 
and to teach farmers that they have new options (and responsibilities) for voicing their 
opinions through the union.  The union could also serve as another source of information 
and generate alternative perspectives for framing the CP debates, improving asymmetries 
of information and power, and improving farmers’ bargaining positions overall at the 
primary, secondary and tertiary levels.   
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Farmers have the incentive to organize themselves if they perceive that the costs 
of organizing will pay off in the future.  Union members’ and active delegates’ 
commitment to invest in change to date seem to be the result of a willingness to incur 
personal costs of risk for the benefit of group.  None of these options, however, address 
the problem of monopolized service provision. 
External agents like donors and journalists can leverage the financial incentives 
and public opinion to hold the GOM and ON officials accountable for poor performance 
levels vis a vis excess expenditures and inability to advance poverty-reduction goals.  
They have the opportunity to play an important role in promoting ON investments in 
rules and line items that specifically address power and information asymmetries and 
appropriate skills training for farmer delegates.  Insisting on rules for the translation of 
and public comment on important documents is one way.  Funding regularly held zone 
and secondary level farmer information sessions is part of the costs of irrigation service 
provision.  Funding these costs can reduce physical costs of production by improving the 
choice of investments and by improving farmers’ interest in providing feedback and 
accepting ownership for strategy implementation.   
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5  CASE 2:  SMALL SCALE PUMP-IRRIGATED VILLAGE PERIMETERS 
 
In the late 1980s, when Mali faced a period of drought and heightened food 
insecurity, international donors and the Government of Mali amplified its efforts to 
expand the number of small pump-irrigated village perimeters operating in the North, 
referred to by the acronym in French as PPIVs (Petits Perimetres Irrigues Villagois).  
Pump irrigation was viewed as a way to increase food supply and reduce poverty in the 
region by increasing control over existing water resources.  PPIV rice production was the 
focus in the regions of Mopti, Tombouctou, and Gao, but PPIVs were also established in 
Kayes for vegetable production.
25 
PPIVs primarily refer to irrigation schemes (15-40 hectares) around villages 
along the Niger River in which diesel motor pumps (group motopompes – GMPs) are 
used to pump river water over a dyke into a network of lined or unlined canals.  The 
European Union leads PPIV efforts in Mali, having funded over 1,300 hectares of PPIVs 
in Mopti from 1989-2002 through a project called VRES (Valorisation des Resources en 
Eau de Surface).  VRES aims to develop another 1,200 hectares before 2007 in 
conjunction with the NGO, Action pour la Formation et l’Autopromotion Rurale (ONG-
AFAR).  The governmental Office Riz Mopti (ORM) maintains 12 PPIVs and is seeking 
funds to expand its program as well.   
The timeliness of this case review is underscored by two events.  First, when 
originally conceived, high subsidies from donors and the state were considered to be 
acceptable under the auspices that food security was of national interest (a joint impact 
good) warranting public subsidy to ensure its production.  Extensive funding of GMPs, 
                                                 
25 According to the SNDI, 60-75% of PPIV rice production is consumed by the household.  
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fuel, and inputs were distributed after the 1984 drought (ARD, 2002).  PPIVs developed, 
yields per hectare and the number of hectares developed for PPIV agriculture increased.   
Through the late 1990s, development trends started to move toward principles of cost-
recovery, and, in irrigation specifically, toward Participatory Irrigation Management 
(PIM) and Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT); one of the major PPIV donors, VRES, 
initiated efforts in 2001 to make PPIVs self-sufficient (Goro, 2004).  VRES was to stop 
subsidizing GMP repairs, technical support, and other irregular infusions of financial 
support.  PPIV failure rates increased, and alternatives to improve PPIV financial 
sustainability were explored (See Appendix III).  
The second event was the arrival of a new large donor to the PPIV scene.  
USAID was interested in funding PPIVs and began by donating three GMPs in 2004.  
Questions surfaced regarding how, and even if recipients should pay for the GMPs.   
Related, what price should PPIVs pay donors for a new GMP and should they have to 
pay at all if they are unable to select the GMP type?  Would it better to give the GMP to 
the farmers’ associations, to GMP rental firms, GMP mechanics, or other to other NGOs 
working in the region?  If the original GMP were subsidized completely or in part, what 
institutional arrangements would improve the quality of GMP repair and renewal?  The 
debate that ensued revealed a lack of research and information used to inform existing 
donor choices.  It also moved away from evaluating pricing as a tactic to support the 
goals of poverty reduction and food security, defining the issue as one solely of financial 
cost recovery.   
This case study is not a comprehensive quantitative analysis but serves 
primarily to identify areas for future institutional research based on the limited time and  
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data that were available to describe the situation.  Different approaches to GMP 
acquisition and service are described below based on how each approach affects the costs 
and prices of PPIV irrigation, in particular, GMP life expectancy and the related seasonal 
depreciation costs.  PPIVs can lease, rent or purchase GMPs; GMP service arrangements 
vary accordingly.   Some PPIVs hired GMP service technicians for a fixed price per 
season.  Others have servicing costs included in their lease or rental contract.  Many 
simply hire repair services on an as-needed basis.  The various approaches and related 
incentives to provide quality service are described, but data was not available to estimate 
how each approach may have changed long-run costs based on extended or shortened 
GMP lifespan.   
The Garage Modern (private) and Association des Volontaires pour le 
Developpment du Delta (AVD) – Association of Volunteers for the Development of the 
Delta (NGO)— are two specific service providers reviewed in this report because of how 
their contractual designs and activities increased different stakeholders’ incentives to 
invest effort into lowering prices (Section 5.4).   The Garage primarily leased equipment 
and would service by season or on an as-needed basis.  AVD leased, rented, or sold new 
and rebuilt GMPs as well as the separated motors and pumps.  Leased equipment 
generally included a service arrangement in which an AVD-trained mechanic lived in the 
village throughout the season.  While the Garage was a private business, AVD’s mission 
was to develop the GMP service and provision sector by increasing price and cost 
transparency, training new mechanics to improve competition, and to teach PPIVs how to 
manage GMP contracts.   
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Reports are mixed with respect to the degree of PPIV successes.  Officials from 
both VRES and ORM PPIV programs cited normal rice yields to fall in the range of five 
to six tons a hectare.  VRES claims at least 400 hectares have been developed into similar 
schemes without donor or government support due to the demonstrated success of the 
approach (ARD, 2002).  Yet, only 54% of VRES-constructed perimeters were operational 
in 2002, and that percentage may be declining as the organization moves to reduce free 
provision of O&M and technical support (SOFRECO, 2003).  Those PPIVs that continue 
to operate are not guaranteed to be financially profitable, even with 100% start-up 
subsidies.
26  Motor pumps are expensive to purchase and operate.  Parts, reliable 
mechanics, information, and village-level financial management skills are all scarce 
goods and difficult to differentiate with respect to quality of service provision (pervasive 
adverse selection problems).    
ORM PPIVs cultivate one season a year, and contrary to VRES perimeters, 
100% of ORM perimeters remain operational.  Start-up costs are subsidized 100%, as 
with VRES perimeters, differing only in that ORM contracts for the machine construction 
of the canal network and lines canals, whereas VRES projects require farmers to develop 
their land and canals by hand, often without canal lining.  The difference in canal quality 
results in significant water losses for the unlined canals.  Not lining the canals makes 
them less expensive to construct and builds on the ideal of farmer participation, but it also 
increases pump operation time and cost, speeding up the rate of depreciation (SOFRECO, 
2003).   
                                                 
26 Unpublished calculations done by Alpha Kargne, agricultural economist for USAID production project, 
PRODEPAM.  
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A PPIV-VRES institutional relationship is maintained by formal network of 
PPIV farmer committees and VRES-hired extension agents.  Formally, extension agents 
are only to provide fee-based services after the first year of PPIV operation.  Depending 
on village needs and the agents’ willingness, extension agents may end up providing free 
technical advice and supporting or even conducting day-to-day accounting tasks and 
input acquisition ( Macalou, 2004). 
While the ORM officially only offers free crop technical support, ORM 
administrators admitted to advising on GMP technical problems and acquisitions.  ORM 
holds regular training seminars for all GMP operators to improve routine O&M and 
reduce GMP depreciation rates.  The coordinating committee president (a local farmer) 
and the ORM PPIV director seemed to have an open, respectful and informed working 
relationship in the meeting I attended.  As well, the ORM’s PPIV director seemed to 
generally respect the PPIV farmers he worked with based on his descriptions of their 
work and effort levels while recognizing their skill constraints.  This was a notable 
difference after speaking with/listening to ON farmer-administration relations.   
Both VRES and ORM have one or more small (1.5 ha) women-operated 
vegetable PPIVs.  Often, GMPs also irrigate small vegetable plots in addition to the rice 
perimeters, but the women and children who cultivate these plots are not subject to fees 
and have no official say in the perimeter decision-making process or management.  I did 
not collect information on how usufruct rights were distributed or retained for these plots. 
5.1  Price Objective/Level 
Irrigation pricing in PPIVs has the sole objective of financial cost recovery.  
Farmers pay a redevance that covers irrigation-related costs plus the costs of inputs such  
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as seed, fertilizers, pest control, and canal-network maintenance.  A PPIV-elected 
committee of farmers is responsible for all purchasing and payments.  The redevance is 
calculated and assessed at the end of the growing season.   
This section discusses what factors contribute to variation among PPIV price 
levels; section 5.4, Costs and Decision Making, elaborates on why the costs of certain 
line items can vary significantly.  Unfortunately, it does not compare or analyze the range 
of price levels found in different organizations and areas due to lack of data.  VRES and 
AFAR published average redevance costs in 1998 at 176,000 CFAF/ha (field and harvest 
labor not included; based on a 30-acre perimeter).
27  This surpassed the SNDI-based 
suggested maximum New Irrigation Fee redevance for PPIVs of 100,000 CFAF/ha (set in 
1999) by 76%.   More recent averages were not available during my visits.  Future 
research to collect information on the different redevance  levels  and the perimeter 
characteristics could provide interesting and important insights into how to make pricing 
promote sustainable irrigation production.
28 
                                                 
27 The budget sheet I was given for an AFAR perimeter (PPIV Diantakaye in 1998, Table 2) shows a 
redevance of about 150,000 CFAF/ha for a 19.5 ha perimeter, reflecting increasing costs if compared to the 
30 ha redevance of 176,000 CFAF/ha provided by the organization as an average for the same year (Table 
3).  In this case, Diantakaye farmers paid 57% more than the SNDI policy-suggested maximum irrigation 
fee.  GMP costs were more than 60% of the total, 76,316 CFAF/ha; of that depreciation was 26,316 CFAF 
or about 1/3 of GMP costs and 1/6 of total redevance costs (without labor).  The Diatakaye perimeter 
calculated an average income per ha of 466,259 CFAF (after all non labor-related costs).  SOFRECO did 
not cite its source of data and may have drawn from the same AFAR document with its 1998 averages.   
28 Characteristic variables that would be interesting to regress on redevance level might include donor 
organization, perimeter size, number of years of perimeter operation, type of GMP provision arrangement, 
and percentage of the redevance that was GMP depreciation and GMP total costs, distance from urban area.   
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Table 2 AFAR Cost Sheet for PPIV Diantakaye, 1998  
Surface (ha)…………………….19.5 
Yield, paddy (t/ha) ………………5 
Price, paddy (CFAF/kg)………..125 
Cost of labor (CFAF/day)………750 
Growing seasons per year………..1 
Average plot size (ha)….……….0.33 
 
Costs  Dose per ha  Cost per unit  Cost per hectare 
Inputs     71,000 
Seed (kg)  60  125  7500 
DAP (kg)  100  260  26000 
Urea (kg)  150  250  37500 
Phytosanitary  products    0  0 
Water Service     49,925 
Fuel  80  275  22000 
Pump Oil  1.5  1000  1500 
GMP 
maintenance/repair     10000 
Perimeter 
maintenance/repair  15 750  11250 
Pump operator salary      5175 
COOP management      2,500 
Management  salaries     
Vehicles/fuel     
Meetings     
Telephone     
 Other        
 Labor and Services     170250 
Soil preparation  3  3000  9000 
 Sowing seeds (ha*day)  50  750  37500 
 Maintenance (ha*day)  65  750  48750 
 Harvest (ha*day)  100  750  75000 
  Winnowing  (ha*day)     
 GMP Depreciation     26,316 
 TOTAL     149,741 
 
According to an engineering firm’s study of irrigation costs in Mali, total costs 
of PPIV operations are dominated by GMP costs (40% of total redevance) including 
pump operators’ salaries, fuel, oil, repair parts, servicing, and depreciation (SOFRECO, 
2003).  A VRES analysis of all the organization’s project perimeter budgets in 1998  
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(Table 3) supported the SOFRECO estimate; average GMP costs amounted to 
approximately 35% of total costs per hectare,  (99,000 CFAF/ha).   
Table 3 VRES Average costs per ha for all project PPIVs in 1998, based on a 30 ha 
perimeter  (GMP related costs highlighted) 
  Quantity  Price per unit in CFAF  Total CFAF 
VARIABLE COSTS      
Phosphates 100kg  295  29,500 
Urea 100kg  285  28,500 
Seed 50  kg  150  7,500 
Fuel  120 l  275  33,000 
Oil  2 l  1,000  2,000 
GMP maintenance and repairs      10,000 
Coop operational costs 
(transportation, phone, fuel, etc.)     5,000 
Bagging (75 bags of 80 kg rice to last 
3 seasons)  75/3 400  10,000 
Sub total 1      125 500 
      
LABOR      
Labor 35  ho/day  700  24,500 
Prep, spray, seedlings planted  20 ho/day  700  14,000 
Seedlings distributed to fields  80 ho/day  700  56,000 
GMP operation, field surveillance  35 ho/day  700  24,500 
Weeding 30  ho/day  700  21,000 
Harvest 100  ho/day  700  70,000 
Sub total 2  300  700  210,000 
      
FIXED COSTS  
(total cost/expected life) 
    
Storage building  (12,800,000/50 yrs)      8,533 
GMP 400 m3 (6,500,000/15 seasons)      14,444 
Accessories (9,000,000/20 seasons)      15,000 
Fuel storage (2,000,000/30 yrs)       2,222 
Perimeter (16,0s00,000/50 yrs)      10,666 
Sub total 3     50,865 
      
GENERAL TOTAL     286,365 CFAF 
 
While it was not feasible to conduct an analysis of the averages and ranges of 
pump costs for various categories of PPIVs, the scale of variation can be surmised based 
AVD GMP leasing options alone (Table 4).   
Comment: It’s not clear where these 
numbers come from.  How do they relate 
to the figures in the preceding table?  
When you talk about “GMP costs”  --e.g., 
in this last sentence, are you referring to 
total costs or total NON-LABOR costs?  I 
think it’s the latter.  But logically, I 
would think that lab or for “maintenance” 
[of the GMP?  or the irrigation system?} 
ought to be included in the GMP costs.  I 
can see why you might want to exclude 
the other crop production and harvesting 
costs.  In general, you need to make the 
links between the tables you present and 
the discussion here in the text clearer. 
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AVD leases equipment by the month.  Its rental prices, based on GMP type, 
age, and pumping capacity of the GMP, can vary up to 70% (676,000 to 1,148,000 
CFAF/mo; 22,530 to 38,266 CFAF/ha/mo).  Furthermore, according to AVD, the rate at 
which the pump is operated can cause diesel fuel consumption to vary up to 100% (for 
the budgets sited above, fuel was 22,000-33,000 CFAF/ha, both significant figures if 
doubled).  GMPs must pump at high flow rates if the perimeter is large relative to the 
pump capacity.  If the operator is not well trained, diesel fuel use may increase as well; 
pumping more hours at lower flow rates may use less diesel fuel and reduce the rate of 
machine depreciation compared with pumping fewer hours at high flow rates.  Similarly, 
fuel consumption increases if the GMP is poorly maintained or if extra water must be 
pumped because the canal network was developed with unlined canals and/or if the 
canals are not maintained well (illustrating the trade-off among costs related to quality 
canal construction, operator training, GMP diesel fuel, and canal maintenance).   
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Table 4  AVD-Delta worksheet of the fixed costs of renting a GMP with rebuilt motor and rebuilt pump as compared with the fixed costs of 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Price of GMP purchase 
 






maintenance and upkeep 
fee (after 4,000 hrs of use) 
 
Total financing fees 
 

























































































































































































Another challenging aspect of setting a price level is appropriately covering the 
costs of GMP depreciation with the redevance.  According to interviews with PPIV 
employees, beneficiaries, and GMP service providers, early deterioration of GMPs and 
inability to replace/repair them is a leading cause of PPIV failure (Macalou Mamdou, 
2004, Seckou Sogoba, 2004).  Organizations’ estimates on GMP life expectancy vary 
from fifteen seasons (AFAR) to as few six (AVD) seasons for new equipment.  Based 
AVD’s sample budget, this difference would more than double the line item for 
depreciation costs alone in a 30-hectare perimeter’s redevance (from 10,000 to 26,000 
CFAF/ha in 2004).  Doubling the  depreciation line item in the average 1998 AFAR 
budget from above would increase the total redevance by about 8%. 
5.2  Price Structure 
Total perimeter input costs are distributed among farmers strictly by proportion 
of their parcel size relative to the area of the irrigated perimeter.  Because farmers 
purchase inputs collectively, their per unit input costs are equal.  Farmers also have little 
to no control over the amount of water that flows past their parcel, so quantity-based 
pricing is not feasible.  At this time, there is no objective for which prices should be 
structured in any way other than uniformly, per hectare. 
5.3  Sanctions 
In both ORM and VRES perimeters, formal rules sanction non-payment of the 
redevance with eviction.  Parcel sizes are between .25 and .33 hectares, so partial parcel 
retention is not a reasonable option for partial fee payment.  Late payments are not 
officially permitted in either scheme, but in both cases user association representatives 
indicated that late payments were accepted.  Fees are still due in the event of eviction due 
to non-payment but are rarely collected.  
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Two institutional measures for upward accountability exist for farmers to hold 
elected committee members accountable for appropriate management of redevance 
collection and expenditure.  The first is in the process of committee elections.   The 
functionality of this sanction depends on the number of farmers within the perimeter who 
are literate/numerate and can perform the necessary duties of an elected official; it also 
depends on other power relationships that may be working in the village to discourage 
accountability.  The second level of accountability is the farmers’ ability to bring 
complaints before the coordinating council made up of representatives from a number of 
PPIVs (described below).   
The existence of both of these formal options is an important benefit of 
participatory irrigation management that does not exist in the ON structure.  The 
effectiveness of the sanctions in discouraging moral hazard problems may vary from 
perimeter to perimeter based prevailing informal institutions and farmers’ means to 
identify a problem and/or to take action. 
5.4  Costs and Decision Making 
Most formal rules for PPIVs are handed down from the relevant administrative 
organization (VRES, AFAR or ORM).  Otherwise, the PPIV system generally supports 
participatory irrigation management practices.  In all cases, farmers elect a perimeter 
management committee from among themselves.  Members of the committee are 
responsible for purchasing perimeter inputs, assessing and collecting fees, enforcing 
sanctions, and can develop PPIV-level rules.   
From among the representatives of each PPIV, a coordinating council is elected 
to serve as an intermediary between the donor or administrative agency (VRES or ORM)  
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and the farmers.  This coordinating council helps resolve conflict at the perimeter level 
upon request from farmers or committee members.  In both arrangements, elections are to 
be held every three years.  
The village perimeter committee has responsibility for the continued and 
affordable operation of a diesel motor pump.  GMP-related costs are possibly the most 
variable portion of total seasonal costs.  Their level can determine whether a PPIV 
reduces poverty or results in increased farmer debt and closes after a few seasons.   
Unfortunately, there is no accurate figure for the average rate of GMP 
depreciation.
29  Furthermore, the difference in GMP life-expectancy estimates between 
AFAR and AVD are based on estimates but do not reflect calculated differences of how 
long GMPs tend to last for each organization.  AFAR representatives suggested that AVD 
exaggerated numbers so that it can charge higher depreciation fees.  AVD counters that 
AFAR overestimates the life of GMPs.  While the annual redevance may be lower for 
farmers early in a GMPs life, AFAR/VRES PPIVs rarely have sufficient funds for GMP 
replacement.  Replacement funds are used for expensive repairs, or repairs and quality 
upkeep are not made properly, reducing the life of the GMP to the point that insufficient 
                                                 
29 Depreciation is generally based on the ‘average’ the life of the GMP by counting number of seasons 
used.  Using this average avoids the important issue of why some GMPs last longer than others.     
Furthermore, the figure is too rough to be useful, since season and off-season depreciation are not the same; 
GMP depreciation from 12 rainy seasons is not equivalent to 6 years of double cropping.  During the rainy 
season, GMPs may only be used a few times a month, for a few hours each time.  During the dry season, 
pumps run 8-12 hours every day and GMPs depreciate much faster.  There is no standard among farmers to 
practice double cropping or not, so the choice may vary by year.  Unfortunately, no organizations have data 
for the average life of GMPs based on the number of hours operated.  Using expected life of GMP listed in 
purchase manuals is also misleading, as conditions of operation in Mali are significantly different from 
those in Europe.  Furthermore, options to invest in GMP renewal versus increasing repair costs of an aging 
GMP versus renewing only the pump or only the motor separately as necessary would all be evaluated 
differently depending on the PPIV’s skill set and knowledge and the resources of the GMP service and 
acquisition sector – both of which can be developed to reduce costs.  Identifying basic areas of 
improvement can be done without these data by focusing on the first question above of why certain GMPs 
last longer.  Exploring this issue is likely to present better variables on which to base the design of a 
consequent statistical inquiry.  
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savings accumulate by the time of GMP exhaustion.  The ORM uses estimates provided 
by the manufacturers - admittedly poor estimates given that the GMP manuals base the 
estimates on GMP performance in European climates, inputs and servicing schedules. 
Even averaging the actual GMP lives for all perimeters would be a misleading 
guide for pricing.  The variation among perimeters is significant but not randomly so.  
The factors below influence the level of and relationship between GMP acquisition and 
operational costs. 
1.  Financial management quality a) among PPIV members and b) between PPIVs 
and service providers (e.g., literacy, basic knowledge of pump operation and use 
issues, follow-up with all involved parties, good contracts and agreements, conflict 
resolution skills, transparency and comprehension of costs and expenditures, etc.) 
2.  GMP operation quality (e.g., warming up the engine, understanding pump and 
motor pumping curve, turning off the motor if there are odd noises, coolant leaks, 
etc. and related, proper canal maintenance so water losses are reduced and less 
pumping is needed).  
3.  GMP maintenance quality (e.g., regularly lubricating parts, changing filters, oil, 
etc.) 
4.  GMP input quality (e.g., clean and filtered oil and gas, not street-side oil and diesel 
mélangé) 
5.  GMP repair service and part quality (e.g., taking care of problems immediately 
when they arise, having a trustworthy mechanic, having timely access to and using 
correct parts, etc.) 
6.  Appropriate GMP acquisition (GMP make, capacity, and condition must match the 
region, perimeter size, and reasonably available repair services and parts.)   
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PPIVs have different GMP financing problems.  Some PPIVs do not charge a 
high enough annual depreciation rate to cover the cost of GMP replacement.  Others use 
depreciation funds for increasingly costly repairs as the GMP wears out rather than 
replacing a dying GMP.  Depreciation funds may be invested in other projects or lost 
through intentional or unintentional financial mismanagement by the time a new GMP 
must be purchased.  Just as often, a technical problem related to factors 2-6 above 
accelerates pump depreciation, making an otherwise financially sustainable project fail.  
These four technical issues can become problematic if the pump operator is not trained 
well or if the operator does not have an incentive to invest personal effort into reducing 
GMP costs at his own personal expense (either increased effort or by using higher quality 
/more costly products).  A list and brief description of creative PPIV approaches to 
financing new GMPs can be found in Appendix III. 
Final decisions on how to acquire, operate, and finance GMPs with irrigation-fee 
funds are left to the village committees.  Currently, most PPIVs aim to own at least one 
GMP (an operator is hired to run the GMP and provide regular upkeep, but is not a 
mechanic).  Institutional advantages and disadvantages to alternative pump service 
provision approaches include renting, lease-to-own, and leasing pumping services and 
village ownership, are evaluated below with respect to implications for long-run cost 
reduction and cost recovery.  
Ownership.  Application of basic principal-agent analysis illustrates that pump 
owners (principals) are at a disadvantage with respect to knowing the true cost and 
quality of repair services rendered by service providers (agents).  Owners face the 
problem of adverse selection when choosing a GMP service agency.  Post-contract, this  
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develops into a moral hazard problem by not knowing what repairs need to be done or 
how.  With little competition and specialized knowledge, repair-service providers have 
no incentive to invest effort into quality repair provision.  Worse, they face an incentive 
to provide substandard service in order to gain future work in GMP service calls.   
Furthermore, GMPs in disrepair may retain value but village committee members rely on 
service providers – who may also buy and rebuild old GMPs for redistribution - for this 
assessment.  Until competition and accountability in the GMP service and provision 
sector increases, these asymmetries lead to conflicting objectives. 
When donors provided generous financial and technical support to PPIVs for 
resolving GMP problems, this principal-agent problem had fewer implications for the 
continued operation of PPIV’s as tools of food production and poverty alleviation.  As 
PPIV financial independence came into donor fashion, village-level failure to properly 
manage GMPs resulted in PPIV failure, which does not promote food security or poverty 
alleviation.  VRES attempted to ameliorate the situation with a revolving loan program.  
Because the loan program did nothing to change the information problem, PPIVs were 
still paying for services that were substandard or even exploitational.  Not surprisingly, 
loans were not repaid and the program was suspended after one year (Goro, 2004).   
VRES would not release the number of operational PPIVs for the 2004 growing season, 
but agricultural advisors of the organization indicated that perimeter failure rates were 
increasing, resulting in lost value of organizational learning (Macalou Mamdou, 2004). 
The PPIV-service provider principal-agent problem is layered by a similar 
problem at the village level.  Much of the adverse selection problem faced in the ON may 
be avoided by the small scale communities where most villagers have well-known  
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reputations for their skills and ethics.  The moral hazard problem remains, however.  As 
well, the limited number of literate farmers in the community may limit the options of 
who can be elected to the perimeter committee – regardless of their reputation for 
fairness.  Farmers, agriculture advisors, and mechanics from both Garage Moderne and 
AVD all acknowledged that village-level redevance funds are frequently mismanaged, 
unintentionally and intentionally.  Seasonal costs recorded are too high for goods actually 
purchased.  Depreciation funds disappear.  Rules and sanctions are not applied blindly or 
uniformly.  Villagers of status are not expected to pay their redevance regularly in some 
cases (Seckou Sogoba, 2004).  Poor quality diesel fuel is purchased from street vendors 
and money saved is pocketed, etc.   
PPIV committees are formally required to maintain seasonal accounting records 
that are reviewed either by the ORM or VRES/AFAR agricultural advisors; this 
information is public and can be reviewed by any member of the PPIV.  These 
institutional safeguards should reduce the moral hazard problem.  Few farmers in each 
village, however, may be capable of holding PPIV representatives accountable for the 
appropriate collection and expenditure of funds due to illiteracy and innumeracy (means) 
or intra-village hierarchies (power).  Literacy skills and position within the village are 
likely to have been correlated prior to project implementation.  Furthermore, the few 
farmers capable of managing accounting responsibilities (literate an numerate) in each 
village (agents) are most likely to be voted and re-elected as PPIV leaders by the other 
farmers (principals).  As a result, asymmetrical information and power problems are 
manifested at the village level as well as between the PPIVs and mechanics or GMP 
leasing/rental operations.  
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Part of the AFAR mission is aimed at improving farmer literacy and management 
skills of the PPIV leaders in each village.  Farmers are trained in their local languages to 
read and write with the aim of improving power balances and management capacity 
(unfortunately, most accounting notebooks, supply contracts, and mechanics’ contracts 
are in French).  Such measures are aimed at improving PPIV management skills 
(opportunity set) as well as their bargaining and monitoring positions vis a vis service and 
supply providers (power) but cannot be expected to generate immediate results.  
Additionally, AFAR targets an initial set of PPIV leaders from each village for 
training (Cisse, 1998).  Those initially selected for leadership positions, if not already in 
positions of power relative other farmers, will almost inevitably gain relative power.   
While donors cannot be expected to bring all farmers to functional literacy levels, the 
potential for exacerbating intra-village inequities needs to be recognized and better 
understood.  If PPIV farmers do not have the means to monitor committee member 
activities, then election-based upward accountability measures will not serve to reduce 
the moral hazard problem.  External auditing measures for village-level transactions, for 
example, may be an appropriate/cost-effective complementary option for monitoring 
village-level accounts.  
The current private GMP rental and lease-to-own sector is widely believed to 
take advantage of farmers’ limited options by providing questionable services at high 
prices; again, asymmetrical information leads to adverse selection and moral hazard both.  
The result is a strong private-sector incentive to apply ingenuity and effort to increase 
GMP costs.  The President of AFAR explained his understanding of the four ways to 
make money in the private lease-to-own business (Cisse, 2004):    
  76
1.  Pump owner (agent) has new or used GMP of a quality level that is unknown to the PPIV 
(principal).  He sells GMP to PPIV at a higher price than it was purchased through 3-year 
post-harvest payment plan (no technical support is given with the pump).   
2.  Without competition or widespread information about competing providers, the pump 
owner is able demand payment in paddy at a low fixed price/kilo at the end of the season 
(e.g., 65 CFAF/kilo, when actual price may be 85 CFAF/kilo). 
3.  Pump owner can demand payment in paddy during harvest when paddy prices are low, 
storing paddy and selling it when paddy price rises in February/March (e.g., to 150 
CFAF/kilo). 
4.  Farmers eventually are unable to make a payment; the pump owner confiscates the pump 
and starts again with another PPIV.  
Private rental and repair service providers pose similar problems due to 
asymmetrical information and lack competition and perverse incentives to provide poor 
service.  Limited competition in the GMP sector, limited communication among PPIVs, 
and farmers’ limited ability to understand if and how a service provider has acted 
unethically all exacerbate a weak system of using reputations as a tool to reduce both 
moral hazard and adverse selection.  Pump owners do not fear that inappropriate behavior 
will lead to less business in the future; farmers cannot rely on reputation to help them 
select quality providers. (AVD and Garage Moderne do have some level of positive 
reputation as a result of their links to foreign donors but their service capacity is limited.)   
In van’t Hof’s Lessons Learned (2002), the author recognizes the need for 
increased information and training for farmers in GMP-based agriculture in Burkina 
Faso, Mali, and Niger in order to strengthen the entire sector.  He specifically notes the 
need for identifying locally-available GMP brands, increased user training in GMP use  
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and maintenance, increased market information about GMP parts supply and demand, 
and distribution of contact information for official GMP equipment sales and service 
representatives.   
Association des Volontaires pour le Developpment du Delta (AVD-Delta), as 
described earlier, is an NGO working to develop the GMP distribution and service sector. 
AVD focuses on leasing pumping services for which users pay for the number of months 
during which water is delivered to their perimeters.  The monthly fee for servicing the 
entire perimeter is set by AVD at the beginning of season, and payment for the season is 
put in escrow.  The village pays diesel fuel and oil throughout season as needed.  An 
AVD-trained pump mechanic lives in the village and provides pump operation, service, 
and maintenance as well as providing the village with limited training on how pumps 
operate most efficiently (e.g., choosing most efficient speed, number of hours, to reduce 
diesel fuel costs and prolong the life of the GMP).   
This leasing system reverses the principal-agent incentive problem of dealing with 
mechanics because the GMP owner, AVD, is earning a fixed rate for leasing services and 
must pay repair costs from that fixed rate.  The information advantage AVD has over the 
PPIV does not provide AVD with the opportunity to financially profit from that 
advantage under the terms of the contract.   
Criticism of AVD generally focuses on the level of the rates charged, not the 
structure of the price strategy.
30  AVD explains that the higher rates are what PPIVs 
                                                 
30 It is actually difficult to compare AVD rates to those of other service providers or to pump ownership 
because of the variety of motors and pumps available.  The two components are often sold new as an 
ensemble, but trained mechanics can replace/repair each component individually.  Prices cited in the AVD 
price comparison (2004) vary depending on whether the PPIV opts for new or reconditioned motor, pump, 
or both as well as with the horsepower of the motor and capacity of the pump chosen.  Various  
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should charge themselves to guarantee long-term pumping services, and that furthermore, 
through the AVD arrangement, all of the farmers are guaranteed to receive irrigation 
services throughout each season across seasons.  This guarantee adds the benefit of 
reduced risk – a significant benefit considering the statistic that 50% of VRES fields are 
out of service due to GMP disrepair.  The problems such as deciding when to continue 
making GMP repairs, when to renew either the motor, the pump, or both remain in the 
hands of the mechanic who is trained to make such decisions.  In each of the rental or 
lease scenarios offered by AVD, financial profits per farmer would outweigh production-
cost-based fees (when all costs of field labor wages are included).  The AVD approach 
strengthens the GMP service and supply sector in the following ways (AVD Delta, 2004):  
1.  Increasing competition among the few existing private GMP service 
providers; 
2.  Increasing transparency of prices, reducing information costs (all AVD 
prices and options are in writing and fixed so that farmers can evaluate 
various options with AVD.  This provides farmers with a point of reference 
that can be used in negotiations with other private service providers to help 
reduce the adverse selection problem); 
3.  Decreasing risk to crops by reducing breakdown frequency and duration by 
having mechanic on hand and back-up GMPs available  (risk and cost 
reduction); 
                                                                                                                                                 
combinations are suggested for different PPIV sizes (usually 20, 30, and 40 ha PPIVs) and different options 
have different implications for O&M costs and depreciation rates.   
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4.  Increasing quality of service to farmers by training farmers on the 
appropriate and efficient use of pumps for irrigation;
31 
5.  Immediately investing payment for depreciation into purchase of more 
pumps for the organization rather than having depreciation funds be ‘kept’ 
by village for use of purchasing next village pump (avoiding the problem 
villages face of ‘lost’ depreciation fund savings resulting in inability to 
purchase new GMP, forcing the perimeter to rely on increasingly 
unavailable donor funds for GMP renewal);  
6.  Reducing inefficiency in the sector from having reparable village-owned 
motorpumps remain out of operation unnecessarily because village does not 
have financial resources for repairs (according to AVD extensionists, in 
2004, 30-50% of GMPs at Lake Debo were in disrepair, accounting for 
40% of existing perimeters); 
7.  Hiring mechanics (non-farm rural employment) to live in villages renting 
pump services where they can diversify their activities in areas such as 
cooling facilities, dehulling services, etc.  Business ethics is an integral part 
of training AVD mechanics (using status/value as an institution to align 
individual and collective interests that may otherwise be in conflict). 
The goal of AVD is to change the structure of the entire GMP sector so that 
eventually, costs to the PPIVs for GMP provision will fall relative to the benefits.  
                                                 
31AVD mechanics can rebuild old motors and match new motors to old pumps so that the entire motor 
pump group does not need to be purchased every time the motor dies.  They are also able to use old car 
motors and use the GMPs for additional community projects such as small electrification and cooling 
projects.  One VRES farmer reported that some of the villages in his area have started rebuilding motors 
and matching old pumps to new motors after learning of the AVD approach. AVD Delta (2004).  
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Imboden, the AVD founder, recognized that the organization was largely 
attempting to fill the need for a technical school/training program in the region – 
something that is considered normal to subsidize (public investment) in most 
developing countries (Imboden, 2004).  He also recognized the role of AVD in 
informal technology transfer, noting that some PPIVs were beginning to 
experiment on their own with using various locally available motors with imported 
pumps to extend GMP life. 
The brothers at Garage Moderne have been working with ORM and VRES 
PPIVs to service GMPs by contract and on an as-needed basis. The Garage also rents 
GMPs and offer seasonal service contracts for GMPs owned by the PPIV or rented from 
other private rental businesses.  A unique aspect of the Garage approach is that under a 
seasonal service contract, the PPIV management agrees to let the Garage verify that the 
GMP is in good working order at the beginning of the season.  Based on the review, pre-
season repairs may be required to ensure that GMP is in working order at full cost to the 
PPIV.  These repairs can be made by any garage, but must be made in order for the 
Garage to accept a contract with the PPIV.  A set fee is then paid for repair services for 
the entire season – like a retainer for a mechanic (Diarra, 2004).   
The Garage is in communication with serviced PPIVs by radio, so news of a 
breakdown is timely.  In the event of a breakdown, the PPIV pays for parts at cost plus 
any shipping costs from Bamako or Europe.  All costs of finding the part and the 
mechanics’ labor and transportation are paid by Garage Moderne.  Temporary GMPs can 
be used by the PPIV if repairs may take long.  While the Garage  (agent) has the 
opportunity to provide unnecessary repairs at the beginning of the season at the expense  
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of the PPIV (principal) due to asymmetrical information, the Garage faces the incentive 
to reduce number of breakdowns per season – eliminating the moral hazard problem for 
the season.   
The  Garage’s  experience contracting directly with PPIVs is relatively new.   
Previously, the Garage contracted to service all GMPs through VRES/AFAR and farmers 
were to repay the NGOs (repayment was a formal requirement but not a strictly enforced 
agreement).  The bulk of the PPIV clients have continued their contracts with the Garage 
(10 of 13).  Two have dropped out and two other new PPIVs joined for just one or two 
years.  The Garage explained that those dropping out did so because of disputes over the 
pre-contract GMP review; PPIVs either did not want the equipment to be reviewed or did 
not agree to the pre-season repairs identified by the Garage. 
The  Garage  agreed that renting GMPs is more expensive for PPIVs than 
ownership if the GMP is well maintained and appropriately operated.  The mechanic 
interviewed noted that some PPIVs have been quite successful GMP ownership and 
management, but added that if all users were capable of handling O&M appropriately 
then the Garage would not have a much of a rental business.  
5.5  PPIV Conclusions 
In the case of the PPIVs, the pricing structure is fairly straightforward and seems 
to be appropriately simple for the current needs of the perimeter system.  The 
effectiveness of the other three components of the pricing strategy for cost-recovery – 
price level, decision-making institutions, and sanctions – is more complicated.  
The potential for irrigation pricing to serve as a cost-recovery mechanism that 
promotes food security and reduces poverty in PPIV communities is limited by each  
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association’s ability to manage costs and revenues over time.  If this capacity is 
inadequate, cost levels of irrigation service can be much higher than they need to be, 
leading an otherwise well-designed and important project to be financially unsustainable. 
Much of the debate about the potential for PPIV cost-effectiveness has focused 
on the ‘best’ approach to recover GMP costs (among options of leasing, renting, or 
ownership).  This debate needs to be broadened and deepened to address how costs can 
be reduced for all options.  Understanding how decisions are made and how/if sanctions 
promote upward and downward accountability is essential to understanding how to 
reduce costs and price levels. 
External agents, like the ORM, VRES, USAID, and AFAR can play an important 
role in shaping incentives and market structures, but in the end, they do not make many 
of the daily decisions that can drive down costs for PPIVs.  GMP providers and service 
providers’ behavior is an important factor in cost/price levels, but this behavior is 
determined by how their relationship with the PPIVs is structured based on 
competitiveness of the sector, the contract they have with the PPIV, and the means of the 
PPIV to monitor and enforce that contract.   
Committee members must have the institutional incentive and capacity make 
appropriate decisions with respect to GMP acquisition and management.  No single 
contractual solution would be best for all PPIVs, and any one PPIV may have different 
needs as it experiences organizational learning.  External agents such as donors or ORM 
administrators can serve an important co-management role in all GMP provision 
scenarios to address the sources of asymmetrical costs of information, bargaining and 
enforcement that lead to moral hazard and adverse selection problems.   General  
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recommendations below are examples of how external agents can change the market 
rules and power dynamics without providing direct subsidies that might mute other 
important market signals.   
•  Perimeter committees would benefit from, at a minimum, being able to compare 
different price options among GMP providers, reducing the problem of adverse 
selection.  NGOs could also compile and distribute lists of different 
organizations’ prices for purchases, rentals, parts, and repairs to help promote 
competition within the sector.   
•  Promoting contractual designs (e.g., fixed payments per year for GMP services 
rather than cost-reimbursement contracts) that align the incentives of the principal 
and agent so that both parties have an incentive to produce effort and apply it 
toward a common goal, like the example of Garage Moderne, would be a useful 
area for external support. 
•  Establishing and funding a system regular information exchanges or a referral 
network among PPIVs to exchange information about GMP management would 
reduce the cost of contracting for PPIVs, improving the balance of power and 
information and potentially reducing problems of adverse selection.  Such 
information exchange could incentivize providers to leave their clients satisfied, 
if there is sufficient competition in the sector to make reputation a factor in PPIV 
contract decisions.  This could turn providers’ efforts to make profit away from 
generating creative new ways to cheat farmers and toward creative ways to earn 
farmers’ business, an example of how technological ingenuity to reduce costs can 
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•  A system in which an NGO or government agency formally certifies ‘approved’ 
sales and service providers who submit to periodic external reviews could 
provide important information to PPIVs and provide an instant reputation to new 
market participants.  To a limited degree, the Garage and AVD have this type of 
endorsement informally as a result of continued NGO patronage.  Institutions 
could be designed to allow PPIVs to file complaints with an interagency/multi-
donor board against GMP providers or service providers for evaluation by 
external reviewers.  If this information were verified and disseminated, it would 
reduce costs of enforcement and provide a layer of upward accountability that 
would reduce moral hazard problems among service and pump providers.    
•  Establishing and funding (at least partially) a pump operator-training program 
that allows operators to exchange experiences and learn how to better maintain 
GMPs and reduce operating costs could reduce overall PPIV costs.  ORM 
provides these workshops regularly and assumes the cost of this training much 
the way US extension offices provide various trainings. 
With respect to PPIV committees’ efforts to reduce costs, accountability 
institutions such as transparent bookkeeping and PPIV elections are only a partial step 
toward balancing power in a way that will generate incentives to reduce costs and 
address moral hazard.  For monitoring institutions to be effective, farmers must have the 
capacity to use the available information to hold committee members accountable for 
providing the level of services they are elected to provide.  External agents could play an 
important role in this area by conducting annual audits of PPIV financial books to both 
increase accountability and educate non-committee farmers about the process of  
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monitoring and accounting.  This does not necessarily solve the problem of how to apply 
sanctions in the event of intentional financial mismanagement; public disclosure of 
problematic financial practices, however, may trigger a layer of important social-based 
incentives at the village level.  This is one of the benefits of irrigation management 
transfer (IMT) and participatory irrigation management (PIM). 
Farmer capacity-building, at the individual and committee levels, should be 
considered an investment to improving the symmetry of information, bargaining, and 
enforcement transaction costs.  This is an important step toward making farmer 
participation, effective rather than nominal participation.  If such investments decrease 
the high PPIV failure rates, they would increase the long-run returns to donor efforts by 
allowing PPIV stakeholders to learn from mistakes and experience and apply those 
lessons in future seasons.  AFAR recognizes that high PPIV failure rates are more costly 
to donors than literacy programs because of high start-up infrastructure and training 
costs.  Training that addresses power asymmetries through capacity building and 
information dissemination must happen at a much larger, more intense, and more 
multifaceted scale to induce a sector-wide path change from high failure rates to 
promoting poverty reduction goals.  
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6  CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has explored the link between cost and price in two irrigation schemes 
in Mali - the large-scale gravity irrigation authority Office du Niger and a number of 
small pump-irrigated fields at village perimeters along the Niger River, Petits Perimetres 
d’Irrigation Villagois.  I have argued that the effectiveness of cost-recovery pricing 
strategies for improving the long-run financial sustainability of irrigation systems and for 
advancing national development objectives – namely, to improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of irrigated agriculture as a means to reduce poverty and improve food security 
– requires that each of the four pricing strategy components (decision-making 
institutions, sanctions, price levels, and price structures) be designed specifically to 
achieve these goals.  Seasonal financial cost-recovery does not necessarily result in long-
run financial sustainability or poverty alleviation.  How price strategy components are 
designed influences the distribution and absolute levels of cost and benefit flows; design 
determines how/if decision makers have an incentive to invest effort and ingenuity into 
reducing irrigation system costs; appropriate designs account for sources of power 
imbalances among decision makers.  
In both cases reviewed, those individuals who would seem to have the greatest 
incentive to invest effort and ingenuity into reducing irrigation prices (farmers whose 
livelihoods depend on slim margins of profit) often do not have the means and/or 
institutional incentives to invest effort into reducing system costs.  Asymmetrically 
distributed transaction costs and perverse incentives to increase irrigation system prices 
(and total costs) detract from poverty alleviation goals.  Appropriately designed pricing 
strategies can help reduce these asymmetries and reconcile individual and collective  
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objectives.  Understanding the specific irrigation situation is essential to crafting 
appropriate institutions.  
Incentives must exist for those who manage irrigation funds to reduce costs, 
particularly where there is no competition among service providers.  These incentives can 
be measures of upward accountability such as performance-based sanctions or rewards.  
Enforcement of such mechanisms will fall largely to external agents or unified farmer 
advocacy groups like unions.  For example, investing effort into reducing irrigation costs 
is not currently in the interest of ON officials.  There is no formal performance-based 
accountability system for ON officials.  Informally, high eviction rates from non-payment 
will not result in financial problems for the ON given the high demand for parcels, but 
they may exacerbate poverty and inequality problems – particularly if land redistribution 
practices are benefiting ON officials, police officers, and the other key power holders as 
is rumored.  Finally, the ON has a monopoly on service provision so irrigation service 
“buyers” (farmers) cannot find an alternative product or reduce their costs with a lower-
cost alternative if dissatisfied with ON performance.  Media, unions, and donors are all 
potential key players in advocating for better financial decision-making processes and 
fair rule enforcement. 
Individuals and secondary or tertiary management groups have little incentive to 
creatively reduce irrigation system costs in the monopolistic, top-down management 
context of the ON; cost savings are unlikely to benefit the individual or small group. In 
the smaller PPIVs, system cost-savings are more likely to impact individual farmers’ 
lives more directly and more quickly, generating a credible incentive for farmers to 
personally invest in creative cost-saving behaviors. PPIV management committees have a  
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collective incentive to invest effort and ingenuity into cost reductions to retain a 
functional PPIV; in the PPIVs, inability to reduce and recover costs will result in the 
eventual failure of the PPIV.  This provides a layer of upward accountability that does not 
exist in the ON and a proximity among stakeholders that allows for/encourages 
coordination across hierarchical levels.  This collective incentive may be compromised at 
the individual committee member level if management’s manipulation of cost and price 
records can lead to personal gain with impunity.  If there is a functional monitoring 
system in place, PPIV committee members can be formally removed from their position 
and/or the PPIV.  They may also be subject to prevailing informal institutions of social 
reprimand.  Reliance on informal village institutions, however, can also exacerbate intra-
village privilege and power asymmetries as much as poorly designed formal rules.  None 
of these upward accountability mechanisms exist in the ON.  The effectiveness of their 
existence in the PPIVs is a function of whether or not farmers have the means (time, 
skills, social clout) needed to monitor committee member behavior or committee 
members’ ability to monitor GMP providers’ behavior.   
Farmers must also have an incentive to invest in cost-reduction efforts –
improving applied technology, participating in management tasks, or monitoring 
management.  In the ON, reduced system costs are not likely to result in lower seasonal 
fees.  The relationship between prices and expenditures is difficult to monitor for farmers 
– particularly for the portion of funds spent by the ON rather than by the secondary 
committees.  Farmers have no institutional means to hold the ON accountable for 
wasteful or unethical expenditures that might be discovered through monitoring.  As a 
result, farmers and farmer representatives have little incentive to invest energy or 
creativity into cost-reducing behaviors to benefit the irrigation network as a whole -  
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including efforts to monitor ON expenditures - if reduced costs do not reduce prices for 
farmers and do not noticeably improve irrigation services.   
Sources of asymmetrical information and power that undermine farmers’ ability 
to participate fully and effectively in decision-making and bargaining processes to reduce 
prices or to improve service benefits are areas where external agents like donors, non-
governmental organizations, and donor-supported contractors can work to improve the 
institutional market infrastructure of irrigation service provision.  Where there are 
imbalances in decision-making processes, external agents can provide independent 
monitoring and auditing services, advocate increased transparency measures such as 
regularly publishing audit results in newspapers, and provide training in specific skills 
germane to bargaining and monitoring (literacy, technical knowledge, contract design 
alternatives, etc.).  External monitoring and publicly disseminated performance reviews 
are particularly important in situations where there is no formal system of upward 
accountability.  Reputation and moral suasion can also be invoked as institutional tools.  
Investment in these areas can improve the usefulness of pricing as a tool for cost recovery 
while advancing the broader development objectives of increased and financially 
sustainable agriculture productivity for poverty alleviation.  
These areas of government or external investment may be perpetually necessary 
given the nature of irrigation systems like the ON.  Even if farmers or their 
representatives do have the data, literacy, or technical skills required for bargaining or 
monitoring contracts, they may remain on the disadvantaged side of imbalanced power 
with irrigation system management.  Farmers’ lack of employment alternatives and the 
absence of alternative irrigation service providers eliminate their exit option in  
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negotiations.  In PPIVs, if the GMP sector develops and prices and competition are 
forced to be more transparent through training GMP providers and users, then PPIV 
committee members will enjoy some of the benefits of competition, such as improved 
incentives for GMP providers to build reputations for reliable products and service in 
order to retain business. 
Institutional economic theory provides tools for the researcher to look beyond the 
narrow neoclassical examination of a price structure’s ability to meet cost recovery 
objectives.  Analysis of prevailing institutions can help external agents identify where 
perverse incentives exist for decision makers to increase irrigation service costs – such as 
GMP leasing agencies, individual ON officials who do not face an individual incentive to 
invest effort into improving organization-level operations, and farmers who do not have 
secure property rights.  It suggests the need to examine the design of entire price strategy 
– price levels, decision-making institutions, sanctions, and price structure – within the 
specific context of asymmetrical means and power among decision makers that 
characterizes the situation.  Particularly in situations of rapid change and uncertainty, the 
dynamics or formal and informal relationships among diverse parties in decision-making 
and accountability processes are of significant importance to price and cost levels and 
distribution.  Financial cost-recovery alone is an insufficient measure for evaluating the 
performance of a pricing strategy against the development objective of irrigation in Mali, 
which is to support sustainable and productive agricultural sector that promotes poverty 
reduction and food security.    
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This questionnaire guide is based on Elinor Ostrom’s book (1992), Crafting Institutions for Self-
Governing Irrigation Systems.  The questions included in this guide are not meant to be the final 
questionnaire.  Differences among irrigation systems may result in divergence from the questions 
suggested below.  Also, depending on the researchers’ interest in quantitative or qualitative 
analysis, questions may need to be altered to suit those needs.
32   
The first section provides two short lists of variables for classifying irrigation systems.  These 
variables can be used to help select irrigation cases for study, to guide final survey design and 
related, to help structure the analysis of survey results.  In the second section, there are specific 
questions regarding the price formula that can likely be answered by documentation or a system 
administrator/leader.   In the third section, the guide draws on Ostrom’s eight design principles 
for irrigation systems (below) to organize questions for system administrators and for user/farmer 
organizations.  The last section is guide to questions for irrigation system users and draws from 
the design principles and her list of ‘criteria for success.’  
It is intended that the questions will capture critical differences among pricing strategies with 
respect to their ability to promote various objectives of water pricing.  While each system may 
have water pricing different objectives, they will likely include one or more of the following:  
cost recovery, demand management, equity, and economic efficiency.  It should be understood 
that irrigation services include drainage services. 
1  Clearly Defined Boundaries.  Both the boundaries of the service area and the 
individuals or households with right so use water from an irrigation system are 
clearly defined.  
2  Proportionality between Benefits and Costs.  Rules specifying the amount of water 
that an irrigator is allocated are related to local conditions and to rules requiring 
labor, materials, and/or money inputs. 
3  Collective-Choice Arrangements.   Most individuals affected by operational rules 
are included in the group that can modify these rules. (One way to promote ex poste 
compliance with established rules). 
4  Monitoring.  Monitors, who actively audit physical condition and irrigator 
behavior, are accountable to the users and/or are the users themselves. 
5  Graduated Sanctions.  Users who violate operational rules are likely to receive 
graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) from 
other users, from officials accountable to these users or both. 
6  Conflict Resolution Strategies.  Users and their officials have rapid access to low-
cost local arenas to resolve conflict between users or between users and officials.  
7  Minimal Recognition of Rights to Organize.  The rights of users to devise their 
own institutions are not challenged by external government authorities. 
8  Nested Enterprises.  Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict   
resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested 
enterprises. 
                                                 
32  The implementing party may want to consult the Best Practices for Irrigation Performance study 
conducted in many CILSS countries by the Regional Association for Irrigation and Drainage (ARID) and 
the International Program for Irrigation and Drainage Research and Technology (IPTRID).  Results are 
being diffused through the Improving Performance of Irrigation Perimeters in the Sahel (APPIA) project.  
The study’s organization and financing aspects drew from Ostrom’s irrigation management principles.  
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 I.  Variables that characterize irrigation situations (based in part on Chambers, 1980) 
 
Basic  
1.  Average parcel and perimeter size 
2.  Type(s) of water supply over year (ground, retained runoff, retained river flows, lake, etc.) 
3.  Irrigation system (pump, gravity, flood, drip, sprinkler, other)   
4.  Cropping systems/possible crops per season 
5.  Climate/Length of growing seasons 
 
Dynamic  
1.  Adequacy of water supply over year 
2.  Capacity of system to provide sufficient and controlled water supplies 
3.  Formal and de facto water rights of users 
4.  Financial responsibilities of various parties 
5.  Political organization of and among various layers of stakeholders 
6.  Farmer/farm labor relations 
7.  Labor availability (quantity and skill level) 
8.  System ownership (private individual, private business, collective, public) 
9.  Nature of system costs (high fixed costs, asset specificity, high O&M) 
10. Land tenure/ownership system 
11. Financial and educational status of system users 
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II.  Price Strategy Information (could be gathered from documentation or from interview) 
General system questions 
1.  How long has the perimeter existed?  
2.  When did irrigation pricing begin? 
3.  What land rights do users have over the perimeter (e.g., village association), their parcel 
(titled), or other? 
Pricing questions 
4.  Pricing strategy has:  increasing or decreasing block or constant per unit prices? 
What is (are) the unit(s) considered in the price formula?  Hectares, cubic meter water used, 
hours or weeks with water service, crop grown, season planted, etc.? 
5.  Does price have a fixed and variable component? 
6.  Is price based on estimated value added from irrigation service, on the cost of service 
provision, or neither? 
7.  Does price include the value of the water resource itself or just costs of irrigation service?  
Does it include inputs and other production-related costs?  
8.  If price includes cost of water, what determines the value of water (water market, 
government)? 
9.  Can fees be paid in cash, labor, or portion of harvest?  If paid in labor or harvest, how 
is the unit price determined (collective decision, current market, imposed by another 
party, etc.)? 
10. What financial costs are covered by user fees (if available, percentages covered of 
each cost by fees or percentage of fees collected that are allocated to each cost)? 
O & M for: Dams/weirs,   pumps,    primary canals,   secondary 
canals, 
tertiary canals,     depreciation of O&M equipment  
10.1.  Repayment of capital investments;    
10.2.  Depreciation of infrastructure; 
10.3.  Research or extension costs; 
10.4.  Rental of equipment or services (e.g., motorpumps); 
10.5.  Association’s cost of access to water supply, if any. 
11. When are fees paid? (how long do users have to pay fee?) 
12. Is the fee fixed per season or is the formula for the fee fixed? Are changes in the cost 
of providing irrigation services considered in fee (O&M costs may vary significantly 
w/ changes in cost of labor, diesel fuel, other input costs for repair activities such as 
concrete, etc.)?   
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13. (How) Are changes in the value of output ever considered in fee (e.g., due to prices of other 
inputs, yield reductions from disease, output prices)?  Who makes this decision? 
14. Do farmers’ water-use practices increase system costs?  Is price strategy designed in way to 
generate incentives to improve water use efficiency (improved farmer investment in drainage, 
monitoring application of water, appropriate choice of crop for water availability)? 
 
Group Motor Pump (GMP)-Specific Price Questions 
1.  What is the capacity of the pump in terms of irrigated hectares servable? Hectares served? 
2.  Is the pump or motor owned, leased, or rented by users?  If not owned, who is the provider? 
3.  Do user fees change according to the number of hours the pump is running?  The amount of 
water being pumped per hour? 
4.  How are recurrent costs paid (diesel fuel, regular maintenance, pump operator)?  Do farmers 
pay motor-pump fees separately from other irrigation fees (e.g.,canal service costs)? 
5.  Who manages the regular operation and maintenance of the pump? 
6.  Are depreciation funds collected?  What is done w/ those funds before the next GMP is 
purchased? 
7.  What happens in the event of a break down? (provisional arrangements for water supply, 
service provider, collection for repair payment)?  Can you give an example of what happened 
last time a pump went out of service? 
8.  How long is the GMP expected to last?  (often given in terms of seasons, hours, or years; 
estimates of hours are best) 
9.  Do you use the GMP for the rainy and dry seasons? 
10. Has a new GMP had to be purchased yet?   How long did you have the last one? Were 
depreciation savings sufficient?  If not, how was the remaining sum collected?  
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III Questions for Irrigation System Administrators or Council 
Name     Organization/Position      
Place       Date 
1.  Clearly defined boundaries 
1.1. Do non-users receive irrigation system benefits and how might that affect paying users 
(e.g., laundry, livestock, fishing, farmers with informal connections to network)? 
1.2. Who incurs costs informally outside of direct network users (e.g., change in downstream 
flow quality, quantity, or timing, increased mosquito pop., well or surface water 
contamination, restricted access to water points)? 
1.3. Does the price cover any costs noted above (this may include cost of spraying for 
mosquitoes, drilling drinking village wells, providing alternative access to water for 
livestock, etc.)? 
1.4. Does price formula encourage water conservation or is price independent of the quantity 
used?  
2.  Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs to users 
2.1. Are there different categories of irrigation service provided as defined by different 
categories of fees?  (What are the fees by user category)? 
2.1.1.  Do fees vary for different levels of service quality? 
2.1.2.  Do fees vary by quantity of service used (number of months irrigating, amount of 
water used, etc.)? 
2.1.3.  Does value added to annual yield change with the various levels of irrigation 
services (due to increased water supply, lengthened/additional growing season, or 
reduced risk)?  
2.2. Is there any cross-subsidization among different user groups? (Fees for one group 
partially cover costs of providing service to another user group.) 
2.3. What obstacles (transaction and transformation costs) do farmers face when attempting 
to realize potential benefits from irrigation services? 
2.3.1.  Can farmers change crops or cropping practices easily due to decreased output 
prices, to increased water prices, or to the availability of improved water services?  
(e.g., learning, input or output market constraints – including labor, farmer or 
system asset specificity, seasonal lags)?   
2.3.2.  Are some users affected differently than others (due to varied plot size, access to 
credit, information, decision-making power, etc.)? 
3.  Collective choice arrangements 
3.1. What is/are the source(s) of different operational pricing rules (e.g., sanctioning, 
allocation of financial or labor responsibilities, provision of corresponding service 
benefits, collection of payment)? 
3.1.1.  Are decision-makers elected?    How often?     
3.1.2.  How often are rules/contracts evaluated? 
3.1.3.  How do users provide feedback about the implementation of these rules or during 
process of rule re-evaluation?  
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3.2. How can users participate in making collective-choice rules (management, policy 
making, and adjudication rules that define the process to establish operational price 
rules)? 
3.3. Can users participate in decisions that influence system O&M costs (technology choice, 
level or frequency of upkeep investments, service contracting/bidding processes)? 
 
4.  Monitoring and monitor accountability 
4.1. What water or land use behaviors are related to price (quantity of water used, quality of 
land/canal upkeep, etc.)?  Are monitors external or internal or a mix?       
4.2. What strategies exist for users to monitor the collection and expenditure of fees? 
4.3. What incentives/opportunities exist for monitors to demonstrate opportunistic 
behavior/corruption?  Have there been recent problems? 
 
5.  Graduated sanctions 
5.1. Are there formal sanctions that correspond to various levels or frequency of non-
payment, late payment, or partial payment of water fee?  
5.2. Are there other farmer behaviors that warrant fines or can result in increased or 
decreased fees according to operational rules? 
 
6.  Conflict resolution strategies 
6.1. What are the formal processes for users to challenge the application of operational 
pricing rules?    The application of collective choice pricing rules? 
6.2. What types of pricing problems have these strategies been used for and by whom 
(organizations, different categories of individuals, etc.)?  
6.3. How long might this process take and what are the associated financial costs to the 
farmer? 
6.4. Are there informal conflict resolution strategies related to the design and application of 
operational pricing rules (union organizing, strike, protest, informal payments, etc.)? 
6.5.  (How) Have any advocacy groups for/of users been involved in setting or disputing 
pricing collective choice or operational rules? 
 
7.  Rights of users to organize 
7.1. What legal or political obstacles are there for user organizing efforts (external 
recognition of organizations, existing organization pressure on new or independent 
organizing efforts, etc.)? 
7.2. What supports exist to help user groups organize? 
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8.  Nested enterprises 
8.1. What are the different arenas and levels of making and implementing operational and 
collective-choice rules related to pricing (appropriation, provision, monitoring, 
enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities)?   
8.2. Is there a system of coordination and/or checks and balances among these arenas? Is 
there upward and downward accountability? 
8.3. What is users’ primary source of information about water pricing issues?   
 
9.  Equity 
9.1. Are there wealth, gender or ethnic/class differences among users that influence their 
ability to participate in decision-making processes? 
9.2. Are there wealth, gender or ethnic/class differences among users that influence their 
ability to realize the (potential) financial benefits of their land (access to info, credit, 
markets, diversify, respond to relative changes in value)?  




III. Guide to Interview with Farmers Organizations 
Name     Organization/Position      
Place       Date 
 
1.  Multiple layers of nested enterprises 
1.1. What current role do you perceive for yourself/your organization vis a vis water pricing 
(representation, advocacy, lobby, monitoring, information, research, etc.)? 
1.2. Does your organization participate/intervene at various decision making levels?  
1.3. Are there any current price-related projects going on now? 
 
2.  Collective-choice arrangements 
2.1. How are users represented by your organization (members, clients, beneficiaries, etc.)? 
2.2. How do you keep users informed of your activities (particularly those regarding water 
pricing)? 
2.3. (How) Do users participate in decision-making or agenda-setting in the organization? 
 
3.  Clearly defined borders 
3.1. Does everyone who uses the irrigation system pay water fees? 
 
4.  Proportional equivalence between costs and benefits 
4.1. Do you know what users pay for irrigation services?  Do you feel this is too high or too 
low?  Why? 
4.2. Do some users receive better or lesser services for the same price? 
4.3. Do you know what the collected funds are supposed to be used for?    Do you have 
confidence funds are used correctly? 
4.4. What obstacles might prevent your members from improving the profitability of their 
lands (access to credit, better input prices, crop insurance, limited knowledge of 
alternative crops, limited technical knowledge of improving practices, uneven diffusion 
of technical information, illiteracy, etc.)? 
4.5. Does your organization play a role in assisting farmers to increase the profitability of 
their investments/assets (profit per hectare, if pricing is per hectare; profit per m
3, if 
pricing by quantity of water used; etc.). 
4.6. Does your organization play a role in assisting irrigation administration reduce costs? 
 
5.  Conflict resolution  
5.1. What kinds of conflicts do you perceive regarding water prices (fee level, pricing 
structure, quality of service, level of user input, adequacy of sanctioning or monitoring 
systems)? 
5.2. How are conflicts over pricing rules resolved?  Does your organization play a formal or 
informal role in this (including preventative, information dissemination, advocacy, etc.)?  
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6.  Monitoring 
6.1. Do you monitor fee collection or expenditures? 
6.2. What kinds of related information do you produce for your constituents/members? 
6.3. Where do you find areas of corruption in the fee collection and expenditure system? 
6.4. Do you perceive that users monitor each others’ fee payment/water use behavior? 
 
7.  Graduated sanctions 
7.1. What are the sanctions faced by people who do not pay their fee? Pay late? Pay in part? 
7.2. Are these sanctions perceived to be fair? 
7.3. Do certain user behaviors change the cost of service significantly?  Are these behaviors 
sanctioned by other users or by the administration? 
 
8.  Minimal rights to organize 
8.1. Is your organization recognized legally by the government? by the irrigation 
administration? (if no, why not?) 
8.2. What obstacles, if any, do you face in trying to organizing users? 




IV.  Questions for Irrigation System Users Regarding Irrigation User Fees 
Name     Organization/Position      
Place       Date 
Parcel  size    Owned/Rented    Number  of  years   
Crop(s) planted    Yield/ha 
Gross revenue for last year’s crop 
Net revenue for last year’s crop (after irrigation fees and  all other costs) 
1.  Users are aware of the benefits of paying into system. 
1.1. Do you think you should have to pay for irrigation services? (if no, who should pay for 
irrigation costs?) 
1.2. What is the water fee you pay?  
1.3. Do you think the fee is too high or too low?  
1.4. Do you know what that money is supposed to pay for? (in general, water or services or 
both; and specifically O&M of secondary network, canal maintenance, pump diesel fuel 
and rent, etc.)   
1.5. Do you have confidence that the fees are used correctly? Why or why not? 
1.6. Did you participate in any decision-making process regarding what the price would be? 
1.7. Did you participate in any decision-making process regarding what the money will be 
used for?  
1.8. Do you know anyone who did participate in either process?  How were they selected to 
be involved in that process?  (if voted in: Did you vote?) 
1.9. Are you part of an organization/community that is in contact with that person regularly? 
 
2.  Users understand that they will only receive future benefits if they all contribute to 
system O&M. 
2.1. What happens if you do not pay your fee this year? If you do not pay two years in a row?  
If you pay late? If you can only pay part of the fee? 
2.2. Do you know people who do not pay their fees? 
2.3. What happens if no one can pay this year?  (bad harvest, low output prices, etc.) 
2.4. Do you know what your yields would be without irrigation services?   
2.5. Do you know of fields that produce more because of better irrigation services?   
2.6. Have you seen any new investments in the irrigation network recently (upgrades, 
drudging, etc.)? 
2.7. Have they made a difference in the service you receive? 
2.8. Do you know how those activities were paid for? 
 
3.  Users expect to lose benefits if they do not pay into system for operations and 
maintenance (as opposed to being bailed out by the state or an NGO).  
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3.1. What organizations have helped invest in the irrigation perimeter in the past?  What 
kinds of payments were they (subsidies to O&M, motor-pump donations, infrastructure 
investments, etc.)? 
3.2. Do you expect that these groups will continue to support the system? 
 
4.  Organizational and financial capacity to keep commitment to O&M responsibilities. 
Farmers have demonstrated capacity to mobilize resources, allocate benefits and duties, 
and resolve local conflicts. 
4.1. Do you feel you have enough money to pay the water fee? 
4.2. Have you ever missed a payment in the past?  What happened? 
4.3. Do you ever have to borrow money to pay the user fee?  Where did you get it? When do 
you pay it back? 
4.4. Who do you go to if there is a problem with paying your water fee this year?  
4.5. Do you have confidence in the fee collection and expenditure system? Why/ why not? 
4.6. Are you part of any farmers’ organization that has worked on pricing issues? 
4.7. What needs to be done to the irrigation system to improve it?  Why do you think this 
hasn’t this been done yet? 
4.8. Do you share work responsibilities for the irrigation system operations & maintenance or 
management with other users?  
 
5.  Farmers have confidence that water will be available if they decide to invest in other 
inputs necessary for intensifying or changing crop. 
5.1. Have you lost water when you expected to have it and needed it?  Was this due to 
drought or a problem with the irrigation system?  
5.2. What were you able to do?  Did you pay a lower water fee as a result? 
5.3. Are you interested in changing crops to save money on water or to increase your 
revenues per hectare? 
5.4. What obstacles might you face before making those investments? 
5.5. Did you include the kitchen sink? 
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APPENDIX II:  UNION-ON CONFLICT OVER 2003 SEASON IRRIGATION 
FEE PAYMENTS 
 
Productivity for 2003 season was low due to epidemic disease that attacked rice 
crops, heavy untimely rains that washed away rice plant pollen, and the late delivery of 
fertilizers (which turned out to be the wrong kind).  The two farmers’ unions 
(SEXAGON and SYNADEC) requested that fields be reviewed for exemption from fees 
and requested that overall fees not be raised for 2003 as planned in the 2002-2004 C-P.   
 
Not receiving the response they sought, the unions went to the Minister of Agriculture 
and President for support.  Food supplies were promised for the region (but never came).  
The ON reviewed all fields.  Review committees exempted over 3000 hectares from full 
fee payment, and the ON gave a 3-month payment deadline extension (June 31 from 
March 31).  The redevance was raised as planned in the C-P.  A series of studies were 
conducted by different groups to estimate average harvest.  Results ranged from 2.4 t/ha 
(a Dutch firm) to 4.7 t/ha (ON study, down from their first claims that average yields 
were 5.8 hectares).  I was not able to find zone-by-zone yield averages from any other 
source than the ON.  BRLi consultant’s unofficial opinion was that the ON may have 
compromised the statistics, but that the average yield was likely higher than 2.4.   
 
Eviction notices were issued to 4,222 farmers by July 2004.  The Niono Zone was hit 
the hardest:  2,447 small-holder farmers were evicted from 1,914 hectares of irrigated 
land (average of 0.78 ha/per farmer).  The actual final number of evictees is not known, 
as farmers were given one week after eviction notices were issued to make payments.  
The Chamber of Agriculture requested permission from Segou city officials on behalf of 
SEXAGON to hold a protest just before payments were due.  Lack of response was 
translated to indicate permission was not granted.  National guardsmen (gendarmes) were 
called in to end a peaceful protest in Niono in June. 
 
Just from flipping through eviction notices to count them, it was clear that many of 
the evicted farmers had paid part of their redevance but still lost all land.  SEXAGON 
proposed a rule change so farmers only lose what they do not pay for and that history of 
on-time payments be considered before total eviction is imposed.  SYNADEC proposed 
formalizing permission for farmers to lease land to others if they anticipate not being able 
to pay a fee or allowing the ON to lease farmers land if they are behind in payments, 
allowing them one year to find payment funds before permanently taking land rights.   
 
ON officials explained that SEXAGON promised farmers fee amnesty in exchange 
for votes in local elections.  The SEXAGON president denied this charge and explained 
that the ON had cooked the harvest averages and that the ON financed SYNADEC 
candidates in last election for zone delegates.   
 
  It was not clear if evicted farmers did not pay out of protest or because they could not 
make the payment.  Many farmers sell their contre-saison harvest to pay growing season 
water fees by the March 31 deadline.  If they did not anticipate having to pay the fee, 
contre-saison revenues may have already been spent.  
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APPENDIX III:  PPIV APPROACHES TO MANAGING GMP DEPRECIATION 
FUNDS 
 
1.  Bank up to 20 seasons of depreciation funds for the expected life of 
GMP:  Not a good option financially but one of the most often suggested by donors, 
NGOs and government agencies for lack of better idea (recommended for irrigation 
and drinking water GMPs).  Funds are kept safe, but are insufficient since PPIVs 
generally do not last 20 seasons on the same GMP. 
2.  Bank de Boeuf:  Invest money in buying cattle every year and maintain a 
herd of cattle that can be sold for GPM (worked for one PPIV, was a disaster for 
another). 
3.  Buy low, sell high:  Redevance (including depreciation) is paid in paddy at 
an agreed-upon harvest price.  Rice is stored and sold by user association when price 
is high.  Redevance plus earned money is saved in the bank. Funds sufficient to buy 
new GMP and sell old one in just seven seasons instead of 20 and, hopefully, before 
expensive repairs are required (this has worked well for a few). 
4.  Don’t save/collect enough:  Prior to 2001, donors would subsidize the 
purchase of new GMPs if the old ones broke down.  This was a particular problem 
with the smaller-capacity GMPs which were less expensive, but not suitable for the 
20 ha perimeters.  Mechanics report that many operable and failed PPIVs have 
collections of old GMPs with usable parts but do not know their value or know how 
to make necessary repairs. 
5.  Invest in PPIV expansion: Use funds to invest in perimeter expansion up to 
greatest capacity of GMP hoping that greater number of fees being paid will help 
cover spent funds for new GMP.  Didn’t work. 
6.  Mixed eucalyptus-rice perimeters:  Increase the value attained from the 
GMP.  Planting eucalyptus throughout and surrounding rice fields creates a 
microclimate with reduced wind erosion and evaporation water losses, facilitating 
double cropping.  Harvestable trees increase revenues from PPIV and reduce GMP 
pumping hours, particularly during the dry season.  Positive environmental 
externalities gained in terms of wildlife habitat and reduced deforestation of existing 
forests.  This approach also supposedly increased cash incomes in the village but 
trees were not managed sufficiently to allow expected revenues from trees to avoid 
collecting depreciation fees as part of the redevance.  Trees were not of sufficient 
quality to sell as expected in timber market for cash. 
7.  Collective fields:  Some VRES PPIVs have allocated part of the perimeter to 
help cover common costs such as depreciation, and work on the parcels is shared.  
One agriculture advisor/extensionist said all seven functional PPIVs in his zone had 
functional collective parcels but could not anticipate if collective revenue would be 
adequate to serve as a replacement for redevance-based depreciation saving.   
Furthermore the remaining 17 perimeters in his zone were not producing in 2004 at 
all.  Another advisor said none of the eight operational PPIVs in his area had 
revenue-generating collective fields.  
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